

CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY

Russia and the War

CLIFFORD L. STANLEY

Justice to the German People

DOROTHY FOSDICK

A Buck Private's Look at the World

ROGER SHINN

WINTER 1941

25 CENTS

CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY

A Quarterly devoted to Christianity and Social Reconstruction.

PUBLISHED BY THE FELLOWSHIP OF SOCIALIST CHRISTIANS

Contents

EDITORIALS:

	PAGE
History (God) Has Overtaken Us.....	3
Present Times Anticipated	5
Equality of Sacrifice	7
The Long and the Short Range of History.....	7
The Claims Men Make	8
Editorial Notes	9
Christianity and Society	10
Fellowship Meeting	10
Prayer	11
RUSSIA AND THE WAR, by CLIFFORD L. STANLEY.....	13
JUSTICE TO THE GERMAN PEOPLE, by DOROTHY FOSDICK.....	19
A BUCK PRIVATE'S LOOK AT THE WORLD, by ROGER SHINN.....	24
THE INFERNO AND THE KINGDOM, by R. A. LANDOR.....	28
AN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTE, by SAM H. FRANKLIN, JR.....	30
BOOK REVIEWS	32

EDITOR

REINHOLD NIEBUHR

EDITORIAL BOARD

EDUARD HEIMANN	CLIFFORD STANLEY	RICHARD DAY	A. T. MOLLEGEN
WINNIFRED WYGAL	HARRY BONE	ROSE TERLIN	ARNOLD NASH

Executive Committee Fellowship of Socialist Christians

Norman Sibley	Eduard Heimann	Richard Day	Winnifred Wygal
Herman Reissig	Reinhold Niebuhr	James Robinson	
Eleanor Brannon	Charles Arbuthnot		

Subscription Rate: \$1.00 per year; 25c per copy.
4 Shillings per year in England.

Published Quarterly in December, March, June and September.

Business Address: 3041 Broadway, N. Y. C.

Editorial Secretary: Martha Hutchison, 5 Minetta St., N. Y. C.

English Agent: Alan Richardson, Annandale, North End Road, London,
N. W. 11

CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY

Volume 7

Number 1

EDITORIALS

History (God) Has Overtaken Us

For years we argued whether or not we should go to war. The implicit assumption of all these arguments was that we had the complete power to make this decision. Then history descended upon us and took the decision out of our hands. We might have known that it would be like this. History is not as completely under the control of human decisions as either the interventionists or pacifists imagined.

The interventionists wanted us to go to war by a clear moral decision. The isolationists thought we could stay out unless we willed to do so resolutely enough. The isolationists underestimated the element of "fate" in history; the fact that the decisions of others frequently take the initiative out of our hands. The interventionists overestimated our power of will. They (or as we say we) argued that our moral obligation to the community of free nations required our participation. Or, they contended that our own national self-interest required that we act. They are right on both counts. They did not recognize the "defect of our will," that we understand that over all human actions, and possibly over collective actions particularly, there hangs the terrible truth of the confession, "The will of God is present with me but how to

perform that which is good I know not." This is to say that ideally we ought to resist injustice done to others as much as we resist it when done to ourselves. But we do not. The force of self-interest alone finally makes the will strong enough to meet its obligations to others.

In collective life our inability to act is further increased by the fact that we cannot consider our own peril if it is not immediate or obvious. Our self-interest is, therefore, not wise enough to come to the support of our sense of obligation to others, until we stand in immediate peril. However important the national unity, achieved under Japanese attack, may be from a political standpoint, it cannot be denied that there is something pathetic about it from the moral standpoint. Only it must be understood that it is a pathos which all human actions betray, and which collective actions only reveal more vividly. We could not agree upon the peril in which we stood as a national community until the peril was upon us; that is the stupidity of collective man. And we could not agree upon our responsibilities to the victims of aggression until we had been joined to them, not by moral act but by historical fate.

The cynics might draw the conclusion from this fact that man, particularly collective man, acts only from motives of self-interest. But that would be an erroneous interpretation of the

human situation. Man is not totally depraved. Complete egoism would be total depravity. Man has a dim sense of awareness of his obligations to his fellows and a weak desire to fulfill those obligations. But the desire is not strong enough to produce action until self-interest and social interest reach some kind of coincidence. It is interesting to note that already the Wheeler's and the Taft's and all that ilk, who yesterday insisted that Britain had nothing but national and imperial motives, today make virtue of the fact that it is our duty to "beat hell out of" our foes when their militarism challenges our liberties and not those of another nation only. Tomorrow they will be proving that we are fighting, not merely out of motives of self-interest, but to "preserve civilization."

They will be right about that too, as they were wrong about Britain when they contended that the admixture of national egotism completely excluded every other-regarding motive in British national policy. They will be right about us as they were wrong about Britain, because it is no more possible for us to act from motives of pure self-interest than it is to act from motives of pure social interest.

It is this fact which makes such nonsense of all purely moral interpretations of human action, and which tempts pure moralists to be either Pharisees who have persuaded themselves that they are purely moral, or to be irresponsible, hoping for the day when they can act purely, and when they can find a political cause which will stand for international order without an admixture of self-interest or national prejudice.

The political life of man must drive

pure moralists either to despair, or to the fury of self-righteousness and sentimentality. It can be understood only from a profoundly religious standpoint. These two elements of cynicism and sentimentality have indeed been present in our whole modern culture. Our universities are filled with political scientists who either take adolescent delight in proving to their students that all nations are moved by self-interest alone, thus prompting them to an immoral cynicism; or who take an equally adolescent satisfaction in inventing schemes, either educational or political, which will make nations "unselfish."

We cannot contemplate our political life decently without a proper and grateful understanding of the "grace" of God. For the grace of God is on the one hand the providential working in history by which God makes the wrath of man to praise him, and transmutes good out of evil. In the immediate situation, that means that he persuades sinful men to consider the miseries and necessities of their fellowmen by throwing them into like miseries and necessities. Of course, if there were no moral content in our life at all, if we were consistently selfish, even this experience would not make it possible for us to build communities and achieve just relations between ourselves and others, either individually or collectively. There is, therefore, no point where the grace of God destroys the moral content of our life by overriding the evil in us. Even now, while we have been thrown into the community of nations, it will be a matter with which our conscience must wrestle, whether or no we will remain in that community, after the immediate peril is past. Without some

ral response on our part, even the
gic experience of today will not
il us tomorrow. We might with-
w again from our international re-
nsibilities at the end of this war in a
od of self-righteous irresponsibility,
ve did after the World War.

The other element in divine "grace"
the element of forgiveness. If we
not believe that God has resources
negate and to wipe out the corrup-
n of egotism which all our actions
ray; if we do not know that we are
stified" not by our goodness but by
goodness of God, we remain in the
ful predicament of either trying to
d a vantage point in history from
ich we can act "purely", or persuad-
ourselves that we have found such
antage point and declaring a "holy
" from it. It is significant that the
ef organ of Christian isolationism
ealed how little it understood the
mate meaning of the Christian faith
recent editorials in which it sought
persuade British Christians that they
not exhaust the full resources of
ir faith if they did not proclaim a
ly war."

Of course, there can be no accept-
ance of grace without repentance. If
do not understand how sinful even
d nations are, we will have no grati-
e toward a merciful providence
ich makes us do good against our
d and gives us a chance to serve man-
d, even though we want to serve
selves. But also, there can be no
repentance without faith; for in that
e the realization of the awful reali-
of man's collective life drives us to
pair.

Despair is the fate of the realists who
know something about sin, but nothing
about redemption. Self-righteousness

and irresponsibility is the fate of the
idealists who know something about
the good possibilities of life, but know
nothing of our sinful corruption of it.
They are, therefore, always looking for
the other person or nation who has
corrupted it. Thus they add the fury
of moral pride to the sin of selfishness
and bedevil the understanding of our
common history by criticizing the
British from the vantage point of the
pure Americans, or the Jews from the
vantage point of the good Christians,
or the bad continentals from the van-
tage point of the good Anglo-Saxons.

Let us hope that the catastrophes of
these days will not only make us more
resolute in achieving such justice and
international community as sinful men
may establish by the grace of God, but
more humble and, therefore, more
merciful in judging both our allies and
our foes.

Present Times Anticipated

The inadequacies of Christian liberal-
ism in the present world situation
are no other than those which Chris-
tian socialists discovered in analyzing
the domestic political situation years
ago. All through the past decades
Christian socialism separated itself from
Christian liberalism on the issue that
there was no "politics of love" which
could avoid the domestic social struggle;
but that this struggle would have to
continue until a more equitable prop-
erty system could become the basis of
justice. The liberals usually thought a
strike abhorrent, though sometimes
they would condone it, if they could
be promised that it would not issue in
violence. This tenderness in regard to
industrial conflict sprang, of course,
from the same moral logic which now

Promotion of
Christianity

persuades liberals that "nothing can be worse than war." In the field of domestic justice, this logic meant that injustice in industry was better than the resistance which led to a higher justice; just as in the field of international relations, it means that capitulation to tyranny is regarded as morally preferable to a resistance which might spell the doom of tyranny.

Thus the Christian socialists anticipated the present struggle in Christian ethics by some decades. It must be noted, however, that there were some Christian Marxists whose debate with liberalism was not quite as basic as this. They believed in the rightfulness of class conflict, while disavowing international conflict, because they believed that the property system was alone responsible for every form of conflict; and they promised themselves a paradise at the end of a period of class conflicts, which would overthrow the property system and socialize all property. This kind of Christian socialism has only a political and not a religious issue to debate with Christian liberalism. It is itself liberal in its essential approach to life. It is distinguished from liberalism only in having a different way to the same goal of a permanently peaceful society. In the one case, it is to be achieved by individual moral action. In the case of the Christian Marxist, the change of the property system will guarantee a peaceful and just world.

In so far as Christian socialism was Christian Marxism and rested upon this distinction from liberalism, the difference was not profound enough to matter. Christian Marxists, having primarily political criteria of judgment, shift their judgments with the political situ-

ation. Thus, they were allies of the pacifists until last June, and are now allies of those of us who are interventionists. The war and the problems of justice which the conflict reveals, had not changed in that time. But a purely political fact had occurred. Russia had been invaded. Russia, being a nation in which the root of sin (private property) has been eliminated, is of course more than just a nation for Marxists. Its weal and woe determines the moral quality of any conflict in which it may be engaged.

Thus Christian socialists and Christian Marxists again have a united front on the political level against the liberal world. But, in dealing with the ultimate problems of human existence, Marxism belongs in the category of liberalism, however realistic it may be provisionally in analyzing immediate aspects of political and economic life.

The distinction between Christian socialists and Christian Marxists is, of course, arbitrary. We mean merely to indicate that there are Christian socialists, whose basic approach to life is Christian, but who have arrived at socialist political convictions; and that, on the other hand, there are Christian Marxists whose primary world view is Marxist; and they fit such bits of Christian truth into this world view as, in their opinion, Marxism is able to absorb.

The verbal distinction may be arbitrary. But, there is an actual distinction which is not arbitrary. It is the difference between those Christian socialists, whose primary analysis of life and history is based upon the Christian faith, but who also believe that the economic problem of contemporary society cannot be solved without a revolutionary revision of the property system; and

those Christian Marxists who actually believe that revision of the property system will usher the Kingdom of God into the world. From the religious standpoint, this latter faith is nothing more than the Marxist version of the liberal faith in utopia.

Equality of Sacrifice

A war emergency offers both perils and opportunities to the cause of social justice. Conservatives seek to use the emergency to freeze the status quo, and to place every criticism of social injustice under disadvantage by interpreting it as a threat to unity. Furthermore, a nation at war must use such organization as is at hand, which frequently means that the power of economic overlords is increased.

On the other hand, there are possibilities of achieving a higher measure of social justice under the pressure of war. Britain, for instance, may have restricted its liberties in wartime, but it has increased equality. Common dangers increase the sense of brotherhood and the vast expenditures of war tend to level economic privilege.

Taxation schedules become very important in wartime because they determine with what equity the great burdens are to be borne by various groups in the nation. A good slogan for taxation schedules is: "Equality of sacrifice is not equality of sacrifice." When we approach the problem of equity from the basis of a social system, which allows vast disproportions of wealth and poverty, it is important to remember that the idea of equality of sacrifice is generally used to prevent a proper and equitable division of the burdens. A general cut of ten per cent in living standards, for instance, means some-

thing quite different to a family of \$2000 income than to one of \$20,000 income.

We will all face taxation burdens before the year is up, such as we had never dreamed of before. There is a possibility of using taxation in wartime as an instrument for the regeneration of society.

The Long and the Short Range of History

A prominent pacifist clergyman recently asserted that he was able to understand why laymen should desire to defeat tyranny by military resistance if necessary. But, being a clergyman, he felt it to be his business to consider history in the long, rather than in the short, range. In the long run, men would have to learn to cooperate with each other in terms of accommodation, arbitration, rational justice and loving brotherhood.

This is a favorite interpretation of history on the part of liberal Christianity. The idea behind it is that there are moral elements immanent in history, which will gradually transmute human society into something other than it is. The element of truth in this assertion is that history does indeed offer human society infinite possibilities of achieving justice on higher and higher levels. We do not know how far we can go in constructing the delicate balances of international government, in adjusting the rights of various classes in a nation, or in achieving equality between racial groups within a nation.

The error in this "long range" idea of history is to assume that balances of justice could be achieved which would not be in peril of destruction on every new level of history. Just what is it in

history which is to prevent a new tyrant from arising? Why cannot the most perfect machine of government, constructed for the ordering of a community's life, become the instrument of tyranny in the hands of some oligarchy of the future? And how, on the other hand, are we to guarantee that the delicate balances of either an international or a domestic political system may not fall into confusion and anarchy?

History can move toward higher and higher levels but at no level does it cease to be human history. If on any level of justice and order, a civilization should say with Babylon: "I sit as a queen and am no widow and shall never know sorrow," this very complacency will be the beginning of disintegration and, therefore, as the prophet rightly declares: "In one moment will her sorrow come."

In other words, modern liberalism misjudges the responsibilities of present history because it has a false asylum in the long run of history. It has this false haven in the future because it does not understand the basic qualities of human society and human history. There is no era of history either present or future in which it may not be necessary to resist tyranny and in which we may not run the risk of anarchy in doing so. There is no era of history in which man must not seek justice by avoiding both anarchy and tyranny. He avoids tyranny by balancing the vitalities, powers, interests of life into a tolerable equilibrium. But such an equilibrium has the peril of anarchy in it if it is not organized and directed. This organization means that we must give some one, some class, some government, some nation, or some group of nations, more

authority than others. There is no way of completely obliterating the distinction between the rulers and the ruled, however much we may give the ruled the chance to check the rulers. But where there are rulers, there may also be tyrants.

This business of escaping into the future from the responsibilities of the present simply won't do. The future holds the same perils, possibilities, responsibilities, risks, and tragic choices as the present.

The Claims Men Make

The Emperor of Japan's proclamation, proclaiming a state of war, contains as nice bits of "sinful" rationalization as one can find. The emperor declared: "More than four years have passed since China, failing to comprehend the true intention of our empire, and recklessly causing trouble, disturbed the peace of east Asia and compelled our empire to take up arms." Thus, once more an invaded country is accused of disturbing the peace. They did not understand the benevolent intentions of their conquerors.

The Emperor goes on: "Although there has been reestablished the national government of China with whom Japan has effected neighborly intercourse and cooperation, the regime which has survived at Chungking, relying upon American and British protection, still continues opposition." The truth content in this assertion is actually a little lower than in the first assertion. A puppet government becomes the real government and the real government of China is treated as a vestigial remnant.

The emperor continues: "Patiently we have waited and long have we endured in the hope that our government

ght retrieve the situation in peace, at our adversaries, showing not the best spirit of conciliation, have unduly delayed a settlement." "Spirit of conciliation" means, of course, compliance with the desires of Japan, in this instance.

Modern totalitarian politics has made us familiar with all these claims and pretensions. But don't imagine that either Hitler or the emperor originated them. They are the stock-in-trade of all human arguments.

Editorial Notes

Russia was invaded on Sunday. On the following Monday the New Masses came out with an article proving that rumors of a rift between Stalin and Hitler were "capitalisticlies."

Japan attacked Hawaii on Sunday. On the following Monday The Christian Century appeared with an editorial proving that interventionists were romanticists and that its position was the only "realistic" one.

If only history did not move so fast, and if only it took those who claim to understand it a little more into its confidence.

"I have consistently opposed America's entrance into the war," declared a Christian minister two weeks after the Japanese attack, "but the perfidious attack of the Japanese upon us convinces me that this war must be fought and won in the interest of building an international society in which such attacks will be impossible." This kind of logic is bad enough for politicians, but terrible for Christian ministers. The perfidious character of the attack changes nothing in the moral content

of the situation. If the defeat of Japan can contribute to the building of a better international order, we ought to have declared war upon her and not waited for the attack. If it was important not to fight with Japan for the sake of an international order, we ought to have been willing to suffer even a perfidious attack with equanimity and without resistance.

Many of the sermons which now justify the war will be as hard to bear as the previous ones which proved that it was our "Christian" duty to stay out.

It will be noted that the present division of the nations in this world conflict is exactly in accordance with the line-up proposed by the advocates of collective security five years ago. This proves that there was logic in the proposal. The appeasement of Chamberlain, the treason of Stalin, and the reluctance of America seemed to make nonsense of the idea of collective security; but gradually history has overwhelmed the reluctance and the mistakes of the statesmen. The world is now lined up as it was assumed at that time that it should be lined up. The only difference is that the most costly war of human history must be fought to vanquish a group of foes, who could have been destroyed with little bloodshed if there had been collective action five years ago.

The moralists have been telling us that it is not possible to fight a foe without hatred. The truth in that idea is that it is difficult to do so, but not impossible. It is not possible by any resources of the Christian faith to avoid conflict, if a resolute foe threatens not

only one's self but one's dearest. But it is possible, precisely through the resources of our faith, to avoid hatred. We will remember the common guilt by which this catastrophe has come about. We will resist the ridiculous self-righteousness to which all nations in conflict are tempted. We will do the job that has to be done not with less but more vigor. Hatred is not a good support for resolute action. It is a drug rather than a food. It stimulates, but does not nourish moral purpose.

A New York minister declares that when the history of this era is written it will be revealed that "Marshal Petain was the only Christ-character among the statesmen of this day." Which merely proves that some Christians have not learned the difference between craven connivance with tyranny and submission to evil. It's no easy matter to translate gospel perfection into politics without turning it into either nonsense or a perverse politics.

Christianity and Society

Our quarterly comes to you in a new format with this issue. The format is designed to save costs, made necessary by rising paper prices. We do not believe that anything essential has been sacrificed in this somewhat more modest dress of ours.

At present the quarterly requires a subsidy of about \$200 per year. This money has been raised year after year by contributions from a few friends. The late Bishop Paddock was responsible for at least \$100 per year of this subsidy, and since his death we have used that amount from a larger contribution which he gave us before his death. This money is now exhausted.

We would appreciate contributions

toward the maintenance of the magazine from those who are able. Better still, we would be grateful for your help in securing 200 additional subscribers, in which case we would require no subsidy. Will you send us one or two or five gift subscriptions for some friends who might value our magazine?

We would be glad to hear from our readers, whether they regard our quarterly as sufficiently valuable to warrant its continuance. We have had a quiet and uneventful existence for six years. In that time we have gained a very loyal, though small, group of supporters and readers. What do you think about our future?

Fellowship Meeting

On January 29th the Fellowship of Socialist Christians will hold an all-day meeting at Riverside Church, New York. The program will begin at 10 a.m.

The morning meeting will be devoted to a symposium upon the question: "In What Sense Are Socialist Christians Still Marxists?" Professor A. T. Mollegen will chair the meeting, and those who will participate in the symposium are, Professors Paul Tillich, A. T. Mollegen, Eduard Heimann, Richard Day, and Reinhold Niebuhr.

The afternoon meeting will be addressed by Professor R. H. Tawney of the London School of Economics, the subject being "Justice in a War Economy."

The evening meeting will be devoted to a discussion of the question: "What Are Christians to Say and to Do in a Warring Nation?"

There will be common meals for the members of the Fellowship in the refectory of Union Seminary.

Members of the Fellowship are asked
o bring their friends.

Reverend Edward Ohrenstein of
Hinsdale, Illinois is organizing a group

of the Fellowship of Socialist Christians
in the Chicago area. The first meeting
will be held on January 18th when Mr.
Niebuhr will meet with the group. A
Spring retreat is also planned.

THE FELLOWSHIP OF THE BODY OF CHRIST

A Short Service of Thanksgiving and Contrition

"For as the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members
of the body, being many, are one body, so also is Christ."

"And whether one member suffereth, all the members suffer with it;
now ye are the body of Christ, and severally members thereof."

1 Cor. 12; 12, 26-27.

Blessed be Thou, O Lord, God of our fathers, for ever and ever. Thine,
O Lord, is the greatness, and the power and the glory, and the victory,
and the majesty: for all that is in the heaven and in the earth is Thine:
Thine is the kingdom, O Lord, and Thou art exalted as head above all. In
Thine hand is power and might; and in Thine hand it is to give strength
unto all. Now, therefore, our God, we thank Thee and praise Thy glori-
ous name.

PRAYER

Most merciful God, the granter of all peace and quietness, the giver
of all good gifts, the defender of all nations, who has willed all men to be
accounted as our neighbors, and commanded us to love them as ourself,
and not to hate our enemies, but rather to wish them, yea, and also to do
them good if we can; Give to all men desire of peace, unity, and quietness,
and a speedy end of all war, hostility, and enmity to all them that be our
enemies; that we and they may, in one heart and charitable agreement,
praise Thy most holy name, and reform our lives to Thy godly command-
ments. Put away from us all war, and so long as we are driven thereto,
hold Thy power and defense over us; be our garrison, our shield and
buckler. Look not, O Lord, upon our sins or the sins of our enemies, but
have regard to Thy most plenteous and abundant mercy, which passeth
all Thy works, being so infinite and marvelous. Do this, O Lord, for Thy
Son's sake, Jesus Christ. AMEN.

*(This prayer, which is quoted from LIFE AND WORK, the magazine of the Church of
Scotland, is adapted from a prayer composed by Archbishop Crammer and used in the
war between England and Scotland in the sixteenth century.)*

ACT OF PRAISE

Let us, therefore, seeing we are united in faith with so great a company of our brethren, in many lands and divers places over the face of earth, give glory to God, our heavenly Father.

Let us then thank God that we have the bond of faith granted to us through Jesus Christ our Lord.

We thank Thee, O God:

For the Fellowship of the Faith, for the witness to our unity in Christ, across all barriers of distance, race, and war;

We thank Thee, O God:

For the testimony of faith, that in the midst of sufferings and death, Thy grace shines forth in the lives and examples of our brethren;

We thank Thee, O God:

For all that sustains the membership of the body of Christ; for the prayer and thought; for the sympathy and support which every joint supplieth, enabling the different parts to be fitly held and knit together;

We thank Thee, O God:

For all who have filled up the sufferings of Christ in their own bodies; for all suffering dared and endured, and all pain bravely borne;

We thank Thee, O God:

For the sufferings of Christ in the flesh and his intercession for us in glory; for the redemption of the world through the shame of the cross, and the pain of the passion.

O Lord Jesus Christ, who for our sakes didst undergo work, and shame, and pain, we confess most humbly that we have refused to share the burden of Thy cross, that we have denied Thee rather than lose our comfort and security. Forgive us our sin, O Lord, and have mercy upon us.

From refusing to share the sufferings of the world, from forgetting the pain and sorrow of others,

Good Lord, deliver us;

From seeking our own ends, from pride and vainglory, and from unwillingness to learn Thy will,

Good Lord, deliver us;

From silence when wrong is done, from sloth and cowardice, and from love of all that hinders our loyalty to Thee,

Good Lord, deliver us;

From weakness in the hour of decision, from over-confidence in our own solutions, and from acting without asking that Thy will be done,

Good Lord, deliver us.

RUSSIA AND THE WAR

By CLIFFORD L. STANLEY

Russia has had a twofold relation to the war. Since the first phase sets the form of the second, or present one, a full account of even the latter requires a look at the former. Even the former, non-participating phase, on its part requires a look at what preceded it if it is to be rendered meaningful.

From 1933 to 1939 one of the notable features of the political landscape was the irreconcilable opposition between Nazi Germany and Communist Russia. It almost seemed as if heaven and earth would pass away before this enmity would be reconciled. On the Russian side the enmity was straightforward enough. According to Communist theory, fascism was counter-revolution, the throes of dying capitalism, the last terrible rigors before the end. As if to confirm this diagnosis, fascism proclaimed an unending crusade against Communist Russia. Consequently, for reasons of survival also, Russia had to strive against the Germany of Hitler. On the German side, the enmity was fully as mortal as on the Russian side. The theoretical case where the Nazis were involved was less simple, however. It is hard to say what the theoretical basis of fascism is if, indeed, it has any. Certainly one of its three proclaimed crusades was against Communism (the Versailles "Dictate" and the Jews being the other two). If the worst of deeds be allowed, Germany's antipathy to Communism must be considered very deep.

It is a delicate question whether in those years Russia or Germany was the

aggressor. On the whole it was probably Germany. Germany acted beyond its theory, whereas Russia acted less than the mandate of its theory. Russia nevertheless struck back when the attack became manifest. The strategy employed was the United Front. In allying herself with liberal forces in other lands, Russia was cynical but sincere. It is a very moot question how successful this strategy ever was. For the most part it was an alliance of parties, and not a capture of actual governments. The critical case was France under the United Front government of Leon Blum. It was precisely this government that allowed the Spanish war to be lost. Because of the size of Spain, its loss may be considered the really crucial communist defeat, the crucial democratic defeat also, for that matter.

Spain may have marked the real defeat of the United Front strategy, but it was Munich which made it apparent that it was defeated. Munich revealed that the governments of the west were not united with Russia against Fascism. If anything, they were united with Germany in some fashion against Russia. Germany could be sure of their tacit approval of her eastward expansion, if not their active support in it.

The final significance of Munich was that it made the situation fluid. The strategy of the Western democracies had been based on a fixed situation, namely, a mortal issue between Germany and Russia. This made the democracies in some sense spectators of

the struggles of others, exploiters of them we may say. For they deeply disliked and feared Communism, and reprobated Fascism only less. Their idea was to keep these two disagreeable forces at grips with one another, ensuring their mutual destruction or at least the end of Communism, the more hateful of the two. But this strategy fell in the same crash that engulfed the United Front.

After Munich, the Soviets saw that a new procedure was necessary. If Hitler was to come eastward, blessed by the democracies, they might seek to turn him west. The one fixed element in the situation was Nazi expansionism. This force might be turned one way as well as another! At all events a Nazi-Communist rapprochement became possible, indeed likely, after Munich. The denial of its possibility was as vehement on the part of the democratic mind as it was on that of the comrades.

A rapprochement with Germany seemed the only alternative left for Russia but it was an alternative involving great cost. For this colossal cost the democracies must assume a large share. First, it meant on Russia's part that she was forced to compromise her principles. We ought to keep the record straight at this point. Some of us have said that it was wrong and stupid for the democracies to connive with Hitler's crimes during appeasement days. In a sense, that is water under the bridge. In another sense it must be kept in the record lest we forget our shortcomings in a pretension of wartime nobility. Also, it helps us to remember that we are in a large sense responsible for Hitler's power and our own weakness. Also, it was a very dastardly thing to sacrifice the innocent and the principled

to a power which is as nearly unrelieved evil as has come in this world. Dearly are we all paying for our love of comfort, our insensitiveness to suffering, our complacency. The seriousness of our state shows how truly do the consequences of our deeds live on, and therefore in some sense the deeds themselves.

All this helps us to estimate the evil implied in any Russian rapprochement with Germany. It was evil for the west. It was fully as evil for Russia. Considering the theoretical awareness of Russia, it was even more evil for the Soviets to compound with the Fascists. This must be urged against the comrades who clothed the Nazi-Soviet Pact in high-sounding justifications. One of them opined mysteriously that it was "the dialectic". Rubbish. It was as nauseous as Munich, and meant that Russia lost her soul. The democracies should not throw stones at Russia for doing what they did by "non-intervention" and at Munich. On the other hand, the comrades ought not claim for Russia a justification they deny the democracies. If Russia had to make compact with Germany, it was a simple case of survival. The desire to survive is understandable enough on its own level. But it ought to be recognized for what it is. And any entity which yields to the very human desire to survive, ought not to clothe its acts in semi-divine habiliments.

The second element of the cost was the inevitable failure of the appeasement policy, no matter who employs it. The desire of any conqueror is that his enemies may be divided so that he may pick them off one by one. Due to the twist of circumstance, Russia did not live to reap the entire fruit of this particular folly, but if not, it was

ough no fault of her own. Russia served to reap this bitter fruit.

But Russia need not have joined up with Hitler. The mere willingness to do so as a last resort changed everything. The willingness to bid against Britain and France made Russia equal to them in bargaining power. Nations which had not been impressed by her virtue (the United Front) might have been frightened by her threatened vice (rapaciousness with Germany). At one stroke Russia, by confronting the democracies with this possibility, might have saved her theoretical soul and forestalled the evil effects of appeasement. But Russia missed her historical opportunity.

The close connection between the peace and the war, or at any rate the British venture, is revealed by the shortness of time between the consummation of the one and the inauguration of the other. Russia must bear the responsibility for the outbreak of the war, as truly as the appeasing democracies must answer for its inevitability. Neither of these powers, now strangely become allies, may inhibit moral pretensions toward the other. Neither need fear the castigations of the other.

So the war began, not in the decision of Chamberlain, not even in the will of Parliament. It began in the soul of the English people. This is a people's war where ever was one, not a struggle headed down by the masters. How ironic that those who are forever talking about a people's this and a people's that should have been estopped from making a real people's movement when it appeared. This war started as a murder row down where common men fight. It became an outcry and ultimately a roar. Hitler knows in his secret

soul that this roar is the trumpet blast that will topple his Jericho when the seven days are fully past. How remarkable. Some of us have loathed war as a chief iniquity, yet this war represents the cleanest and finest thing we have seen the English people do. Indeed it is the cleanest and finest thing we have seen altogether. We thought perhaps we had outlived the health and the decency of our world. But, just as little as Elijah, did we know about the unbowing seven thousand. And, in addition to this, we thought that Hitler simply and unrelievedly represented evil. Yet, he becomes the occasioning and releasing cause of the whitest flame of life we have yet seen. In all this, so runs the lesson, we see how inadequate were our shallow philosophies of history.

When the great event came, Russia was left to one side. Having made one misstep she had to make another. She said that the difference between Fascism and democracy was but "a matter of taste" implying that the democracies were bumptiously and aggressively interfering with the domestic affairs of Germany. Again, the struggle was called "the second imperialist war" and was thus interpreted as a meaningless clash of rival imperialism. Thus, no idealist of goodwill could have any part in it. Perhaps this was but cynicism, and Russia did not believe a word of it. In that case, Russia idly and cynically made still more difficult a struggle already too hard, making many men uncertain of their cause, inducing complete inactivity in others. Perhaps Russia meant the words. If so, their vaunted discernment of history, their pretension to prophecy, failed them in the supreme hour. For this is the kind of onslaught that destroys cultures utterly,

and its appearance means that our world stands at Armageddon. How could Russia so lose the way, if they really believed that this was a meaningless struggle of greedy powers. Every God gives his worshippers what he can, including such ability to read the times as he himself possesses. There was undoubtedly truth in the Communist secular type of religion, and there was power to read the times. Yet, when the great time came insight failed. Can there have been less truth in this religion than we supposed? Or is it simply one more case of the darkening power of sin?

Whatever the reason, Russia sought to blunt the war effort of the democracies. There was the morale-destroying dictum that this was merely an imperialistic struggle. This was whispered in the ear and shouted from the housetop. It is clear that the Communists of France played a large part in the shame of France, a share only less large than that of the men at the top. In the United States, the Peace Mobilizers united with interventionists and American Fascists to help America lose its way. The ludicrous sequel is that the Peace Mobilizers have recently changed their name and applied for membership in an interventionist organization!

While Russia was weakening the war effort of the democracies, it was helping Germany. It sold Germany wheat, oil, and many other sinews of war. It served as the greatest leak in the British blockade. Above all, it gave Hitler a one-front war. In all this it cooperated none too cheerfully no doubt, and perhaps in many cases it sabotaged or slowed up the aid to Germany. Nevertheless, it assisted Hitler's war effort.

We conclude that Russia helped in a

very important way to bring about the war, and, after it had started, helped the aggressor. In all this, it was only doing later what the democracies had done earlier. If it was no worse, it was also no better than they. This is a very important insight. There are men, some of them not "communists" in any ordinary sense, who have absolutized Russia and given the land of the Soviets a quasi-divine status. How can they give such honor to a course so terrible in its consequences? Russia was no worse than others; but what warrant have we for holding it to be better? Does its conduct not bear all the marks of ordinary human conduct, relative justification (self-survival, in this case) together with self-deception and destructiveness?

Then one summer Sunday, the incredible happened. Germany tore into the flesh of Russia. Many reasons have been advanced for this remarkable course. The one that appeals to me as most plausible is that Hitler invaded Russia in order to win the energies to conduct a long war. This shows how successful the British-American war effort had been. Hitler showed by his act that he knew that he was in for a long struggle of doubtful outcome. Another explanation with merit is that he had to do it because of his delayed schedule in the Balkans. He had planned to strike toward the Near East, so the explanation has it, and toward Africa, but the resistance in Jugo-Slavia, Greece and Crete slowed him up. The heat came on in Africa and campaigning became impossible. Not being ready to invade Britain and needing to expand, as is the way with aggressors, he turned in the only direction left. This suggests a greater success of the English actions

Jugo-Slavia, Greece, and Crete than we had supposed. A third explanation, given by Hitler himself, was his unreadiness to invade England with a full strength Russian army at his rear. A final explanation is that Hitler invaded Russia, resurrecting the Anti-Communist crusade, in order to confuse and, perhaps, buy off the democracies.

Whatever the reason, he struck with the consequences daily appearing in our newspapers. The results in Russia are the same as with the English. Russia has become cleansed and has saved her soul. Russia is now in a position to know what the English have known for sometime—how clean is this struggle and how blind they are who cannot see its truth. Russia is accepted simply as a partner in a struggle so great as to make differences seem almost irrelevant. No special thanks is given to Russia for acting in the conflict, nor for doing her best. This is where Russia, with its theories and convictions, belonged all the time. This is where all men of goodwill (beyond Germany) have belonged all the time. Nor are recriminations in order. All who are in the struggle thought to buy off this terror, to outwit it, and to evade it. All of them came in at the eleventh hour.

The entrance into the war of Russia requires some reconstruction of our concept of the war, but it is not yet clear what this is to be. We had become used to a different reading of the war: the Antagonists were Britain, aided in increasing degree by the United States and Germany. In this war, up till the Russians came in, there had been three epochs. First, when the war began, as we suggested, in the revolt of the English people. Second, the evacuation of Dunkerque, which marks the begin-

ning of the war in a military sense. Third, the passage of the Lease-Lend Act in which America undertook to see it through to the end, whatever the cost should turn out to be. Such a combination could strive indefinitely on even terms with Hitler, and due to preponderance of economic power probably could defeat him.

On this reading the real war is between Hitler and Britain, together with the United States. Anything else is in some sense a sideshow. From this point of view, Russia came in too late to be privileged to be one of the main actors. Whatever its shortcomings, this view had certain values. One who holds it has no anxious questions about Russian morale. He puts his main confidence in British-American resolution and power. Also he has no mortal fears about the failures of the Russian legions, for he has learned to stay his soul on other legions. Further, if the main war is between Britain and Germany, every gallon of gas, bomb, tank and soldier lost in Russia is wasted. Finally, if the Russians could hold out, say, six weeks, no invasion of Britain would be feasible this year. If it were not made this year it never could be made, not even as a counsel of despair. On this view, then, Russia could help but in a minor capacity.

In some sense the war assumed its main shape with Russia out of it and this must be remembered in evaluating events. On the other hand, Russia becomes a matter of supreme concern now that it is in the war. First, there is Russian productivity. This must be kept out of Hitler's hands, lest the war become indefinite in length and uncertain of outcome. Russia would supply some measure of his greatest needs, food

and petroleum. Food it could supply in abundance, assuming that Hitler could cultivate the Ukraine, not an easy task in view of Russian non-cooperation. If he took it, he would have some oil. But it must not be forgotten that eighty per cent of the world's oil is in this hemisphere; the United States has sixty-three per cent of it—seven times the Russian output. Even Venezuela produces (184 million barrels) almost as much as Russia (212 million barrels). There is a second reason why Russia's entry alters the picture. With Russia out, Japan could not have been dealt with during wartime, but would have had to be appeased. Perhaps Japan could have been challenged, if America had assumed full belligerent status. Otherwise Japan would have gained her desires piecemeal and by threats. Even if the democracies won the war, they would have been too exhausted to make Japan disgorge. Indeed democratic policy reveals just such a stiffening. In the third place, Russia must be kept in the fight against Hitler lest there be temptations to fight with him, as in France. Russian industrial cooperation would give the war a fatal turn.

This brings us, finally, to the Russian war effort. Russian morale has been magnificent. It can be compared only with the fortitude of the British under all-out bombing attacks. Such resistance might have been expected. Whether

the Russian Revolution is or was socialist, at all events it was a revolution. Revolutions have a way of freshening life, setting captives free and in general widening horizons. Men who have had a revolution have something to fight for. As for the military effort, it has been notably successful, in my estimation. Some think it would have been better to have retreated without a stand, rather than to set prices on specific objectives, and retreat when the price had been exacted. The Russians chose the latter. I think they have permanently blunted the edge of Hitler's military machine to some degree, probably seriously. For years they have prepared for this one war and they have many of the answers. They know how to use tanks against tanks; they have solved the problem of encirclement. Even at the start, while I conceded that Hitler would triumph in the end, I thought that it would take him a least a year to do it. Now I do not believe that he can destroy utterly the Russian resistance. The two-front war has come to stay.

How remarkable is the turn of events. The democracies have seen their desire, namely, Russia at grips with Germany. And the Soviets have gained their end, namely, a United Front against the Fascist aggressor. But neither quite gained their ends in the way they had visualized.

JUSTICE TO THE GERMAN PEOPLE

By DOROTHY FOSDICK

In these days a major concern of Socialist Christians must be to guard against the breakdown of the will to do justice to the mass of people within Germany. If the desire for revenge becomes dominant among us, our hope of salvaging an adequate peace after the defeat of national socialism will be dashed. We will humiliate our opponents and exploit them until finally, in spite of us, they will take up arms again against injustice. We must see to it then, that we help maintain among our people the desire to do justice to the enemy.

I

For one thing, we must continually point out the existence of several groups within Germany, with varying degrees of responsibility and enthusiasm for fascism. If we fail to recognize these different elements, we will inflict a punishment, justly merited by the Nazis, on all the German people. Unfortunately, the very nature of the totalitarian state militates against any clear distinction between the Nazis and other groups, for the Nazis elite bend every effort to destroy the lines which separate them from their fellow countrymen. The official Nazi boast runs that, Germany is "one Reich with one unified will." Says Hitler: "Everyone in Germany is a National Socialist." This proud claim is further strengthened by much of our own anti-Nazi propaganda. A popular argument in this country runs: if the German people were really opposed to the totalitarian state, they would have overthrown it

long ago; ergo, they must agree with the Nazis. From our democratic tradition we borrow the slogan that a people is always responsible for the kind of government it gets; ergo, the Germans are all Nazis.

In fact, of course, the Nazis have failed to mold a unified German will for which they are entitled to speak. The German people are divided into two irreconcilable camps, partisans of National Socialism and opponents. Among the partisans are the Nazis themselves, and probably a majority of the people, loyal either out of conviction, or merely out of habit. Among the opposition are the people disloyal out of conviction who comply outwardly with the forms required of them, in order to survive, and in addition, the underground workers, and the emigres. The exact number of people now within Germany eager for release from the Nazi tyranny is not clear. Under the duress of attack the numbers certainly decrease, as many Germans will conceive it their duty to be loyal to the state in time of war, in spite of their hatred of Hitler. Yet it is fallacious to argue that because the opposition has not effected a revolution, it does not exist or is sufficiently weak to be wholly ignored. Revolution in the eighteenth century, or in a modern democracy, and revolution against totalitarian dictatorship are altogether different propositions. The German people have for years been systematically deprived of all means of organizing into parties and trade unions, or of

publishing unofficial opinions. The two essentials of a successful revolution, collecting a cache of arms and gaining mass support, are virtually precluded by the efficiency of the Gestapo. Revolution from below against the elite in power is likely, only if the security of the elite is weakened by a challenge to its position from without. Furthermore, a most effective way to discourage any revolution against the Nazis is just this tendency to deny the presence of disloyal elements among the German people. In the end, we will have to count on these elements to take advantage of an adverse military situation to set up an alternate regime to the Nazis. By agreeing to the simple notion, that Germans and Nazis are one and the same thing, we gravely imperil the chance of ultimately getting a German government capable of cooperating in a peaceful European community.

We should, therefore, acknowledge the several groups within Germany, and be on the lookout to recognize and encourage our potential allies. The ability of so many English people to do just this thing is certainly due in part to their traditional acceptance of the distinction between a state and the community in which it is organized, between a government and the society over which it rules. These classic distinctions can be fortified in the present situation if we see the war, not simply as a fight between hostile nations for supremacy, but also as a civil conflict between two elements present in varying degrees in every nation; those eager and willing to accept tyranny, and those concerned or willing to build a more democratic world. As Hans Schmidt says: "In this struggle the real battle lines do not follow national boundaries;

they cleave through the bodies of nations; they cut through the soul of the individual." If we believe this, we will distinguish between the treatment we want finally to accord the responsible Nazis, on the one hand, and the masses of the German people under more democratic leadership, on the other. We can follow England in reaching the German people by radio and other means, explaining our concern for the restoration of a more free and prosperous Germany. Tangible signs of our sincerity can be given to support these pledges, for example the official recognition of a "free" German center, corresponding to the "free" Belgian, French, Dutch, and Polish governments, with which discussions could now be begun on problems of war aims and post-war reconstruction plans. Such a step would not merely indicate the willingness of our government to reach a just settlement with a de-Nazified Germany, but would rally more effectively to its cause all Germans, emigres and non-emigres, who are concerned to put their country back on the road toward becoming a responsible and dependable member of a European order.

II

But we must not only distinguish between the government and the people in Germany. We must insist further that the German people are part of a common humanity. Unless we continuously affirm that they are human beings, fundamentally similar to ourselves in their capacity to suffer, to enjoy, to take responsible action, and equally deserving of opportunities for self-development, we will be in no mood to treat them justly. Yet, it is just this affirmation that gets little emphasis under the conditions of total warfare. The tend-

enemy is rather to reduce the Germans to a non-human level, describing them as incapable of normal human emotions, or of assuming the responsibilities of men. In this way an easy explanation of the cause and cruelty of the war is provided. It is now popular to call the Germans "swine", and to interpret the present conflict as a battle between "beasts and human beings", recalling Kipling's notorious division of the world in 1915 into "human beings and Germans." Cartoons represent the German nation as a gorilla, a mad-dog, or a pig. It is a hopeful sign that the most degrading descriptions are frequently restricted to the Nazis, while the bulk of the German people are credited with human qualities of mind and character. So Mr. Morrison in the House of Commons half humorously said of Hess: "It doesn't matter what kind of animal he is—whether he is Rat No. 1, or a Trojan horse, or just a giant panda come over here in the vain hope of finding innocents to play with. The main thing is that he is caged. Whatever his reason for coming here, the German people are, to put it mildly, very much shaken by the whole episode." However, as the war progresses and the struggle intensifies, the need seems to become greater to identify the whole enemy nation with the principle of non-humanity, in order to justify the increasingly rigorous treatment of the entire nation necessitated by total warfare. From merely a casual and humorous reduction of the opponent to the level of animals, we tend to pass to the conviction that there are final limits to the capacity of Germans set by their bestiality. In a recent editorial in the New York Times the German soldier is declared to be "worthless for any trade but war, in-

competent in any act but destruction." "I have decided," writes an American student, "that Germans are creatures who can never be treated gently."

Such estimates of the enemy as non-human are, of course, grossly inadequate. On the other hand, they provide too simple an explanation of the cruelties of modern tyranny and war. Mere animals do not invent machines, or ingeniously calculate how they can best be used to create the maximum of devastation among the opponents. Acts of the Nazis are so ruthless just because they possess the essentially human attributes of reason, and the power to choose the causes to which reason shall be harnessed. If they were only beasts, bound by instinct to predictable patterns of behavior, the problem of defeating them would be relatively simple. What we, in fact, have to deal with are human beings with developed faculties and matured abilities, who are in actuality more dangerous than the brute. Further than this, to define the whole people in the enemy nation as beasts is to assume that those people lack the capacities for shouldering the normal human responsibilities of peacetime. We imply that, even after defeat, they must continue to be handled in the only way that dangerous animals understand: caged, killed, whipped, or cowed. Hitler himself will probably be handled just that way. The London Daily Mail recently asked its readers what they thought should be done with Hitler when the Nazis have been finally defeated. The largest section of replies urged that Hitler be exhibited in a cage, proceeds to be given to bombed victims; and the next largest group suggested the death penalty, by hanging, shooting, or beheading. The atti-

tude toward Hitler implied in these recommendations reminds one of the feeling about an outlaw in the Middle Ages. He was assumed to bear "the head of a wolf", to be the enemy of mankind and therefore liable to attack with impunity. Some centuries later a tyrant was considered in the same light, and it became the duty as well as the right of anyone to "knock him on the head." While the wolf-like characteristics of the outlaw and the tyrant are peculiarly appropriate to Hitler, they do not fit all the German people, and to assume so only encourages treating a whole community in the harsh manner now commonly offered for Hitler alone.

We must bend our effort therefore to counteract the use of misleading and dangerous symbolism. The colorful terminology with which we describe the enemy should be such, that it does not deny the fundamental fact that Germans are persons who can be redeemed for responsible tasks. Then, whatever our language, it must be brought under the judgment of the ultimate Christian insight that we are children of one Father, and therefore brothers of one flesh. If something of this recognition of the common humanity of all men actually qualifies our immediate attitudes, we may finally be able to help the vast majority of Germans secure the opportunities to which all persons are alike entitled.

III

Finally, if we hope to do justice to the needs of a defeated enemy, we must refuse during the course of the war to identify the enemy with the principle of evil. Unless we recognize that the German people are essentially like ourselves in their capacity *both* for good

and evil, there is no likelihood that we will help them into a creative relationship with a new European order. Unfortunately, the propaganda typical of modern war tends to work against a realistic understanding of the distribution of good and evil elements in the situation. Right tends rather to be mobilized exclusively on one's own side, by associating all that is evil with the camp of the enemy. In this way morale is developed for the all-out fight. As a college professor recently declared, "hatred of evil is synonymous with hatred of the Germans." As a leader in the church announced: "God stands with us and the very stars in their courses fight in our behalf. Evil may seemingly win every battle, but God will win the war." Outbursts like this, objected to at the start, are increasingly excused on the ground that it takes just that kind of talk really to stir the people up.

The association of evil exclusively with the enemy is without foundation in fact. The Nazis themselves exist because of our own perversity (as well as stupidity) during the post-war years. The capacity for evil is universal, and to exterminate the Germans would do nothing finally to alleviate the human problem. The particular form which evil takes at any time depends largely on factors of circumstance and historical "accident". In a recent book, "Germany the Aggressor Throughout the Ages", F. J. C. Hearnshaw comes to the conclusion that the Germans have developed attitudes, which distinguish them from their English cousins mainly because of the absence of a natural and easily defensible frontier. At any rate, simply because the Nazis do now represent a peculiarly menacing expression

If evil, we are not released from the responsibility of recognizing that the German people are no more innately bad than we are. To suggest so, is to adopt exactly the racial doctrine we claim we are fighting to deny. William Shirer's comment written from Germany is very much to the point. "S., a veteran correspondent here, thinks every man, woman, and child in this country is a natural-born killer. Perhaps so. But today I noticed in the Tiergarten many of them feeding the squirrels and ducks—with their rationed bread." Furthermore, to attribute good only to ourselves, jeopardizes our chances of handling victory wisely, by encouraging an undue self-righteousness. If by definition our own actions are good, we open the way for an unqualified ruthlessness. If by definition we can do no wrong, we tend to overlook our past mistakes which contributed so much to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of war. Any hope of a recent peace depends on our willingness to bear in mind the failure of our country to accept the responsibilities of a great nation in peacetime as well as wartime, the injustices of our old imperialism, the perils of a new democratic imperialism. If the illusion of

perfection is widely accepted, there is no possibility of a healthy contrition and self-scrutiny leading to an effort at reformation.

Therefore, as Socialist Christians, we have the special obligation to affirm the universality of the capacity for evil against the self-righteous claims of some of our compatriots. We must insist on the reality of divine judgment on our own efforts, as on those of any portion of humanity. We must do what we can to alleviate the worst terrors of the present conflict, and prepare for the task of peace-making in the spirit of a letter recently written by a group of churchmen: "This is not a holy war; no war is holy. Nor is this a holy nation. If, in any way, the United States is an instrument of God in the extirpation of evil in the world, it is a very imperfect instrument. Any sense of a divine mission comes from the Christian obligation to engage in a struggle for the greater good over evil, wherever that evil be found, whether abroad or at home. The Christian cannot help but affirm his real sense of shame and responsibility for this present conflict, but in all humility he looks for the triumph of right in a true peace."

A BUCK PRIVATE'S LOOK AT THE WORLD

By ROGER SHINN

The bombs that fell on Pearl Harbor on December 7th exploded loudly in the ears of the American soldier. The impact was so many times as penetrating as that of thousands of rounds of ammunition fired in target practice. This was the real thing. At this moment reality shattered illusion. Months of wishful thinking and dreaming became distant memories after twenty-four hours of wakefulness.

A disgruntled, unenthusiastic army suddenly decided to be up-and-at-'em. The typically isolationist attitude of the soldier dissolved as quickly as the America First Committee. Many a man changed his mind as promptly as the Chicago Tribune. There are plenty who tell you that morale problems, so serious not long ago, are now ended.

But those who are sceptical about instantaneous conversion and easy sanctification will have some searching questions now. They will wonder how healthy our blatant new national unity and enthusiasm is, and will continue to ask, how well prepared we are for the job we face.

The American army is essentially a collection of citizens in uniform. The cross-section of young men caught up by the draft is remarkable, less for its distinctive quality as an army, than for its mirroring of America. High and low, brilliant and stupid, wealthy and impoverished—they are all here. They have not been easily pressed into the military mold. What they think is

what the country thinks. Probably nowhere else can the pulse of democracy be measured so well. That is why it is so important to see what the buck privates are thinking as they look at the world.

The Army of Yesterday

Before the upheaval in the Pacific, the American army was characterized by complacency and boredom. The million and a half men in army uniforms were getting mighty tired of falling out automatically at the blast of a bugle, going mechanically through their paces, taking orders without knowing why. Between them and the men who made the policies that formed this army, there was a vast distance—a distance which measured the weakness of democracy.

The training grounds of the men who carried the guns were remote from the ideological battlefields of our day. Few paid much attention to a newspaper. If a news-broadcast came over the radio in a tent or barrack, the dial was quickly twisted to something else. Nazism meant only a remote thing that was unfortunately disturbing us.

The army routine itself involved plenty of dirtiness, drabness, and monotony, all of which contributed to the soldier's attitude. But the real trouble lay behind that. The typical soldier, like the typical American, was pretty much of a complacent isolationist. He wasn't eager to do big things. His biggest wish was to get back to normal

life. He was willing to "put in his year" as a sort of patriotic duty, but he had little idea of how it related to the world beyond the camp.

We need scarcely mention the period last summer when morale hit the bottom. It is sufficient to say that the widely-publicized "sensational" accounts of army morale were not exaggerated. When the House of Representatives by a margin of one vote extended the selectees' term of service, the reaction was dismal. It was not simply "gripping", but there was a sullen, deep resentment at the core of the army.

But that time passed. The soldier's sense of humor returned. He fitted himself back into the groove and went on about his job. That worst point was a temporary thing. But it showed up the real trouble, which was not temporary. Complacency, love of comfort, self-pity were thoroughly imbedded in the army. There was no understanding, no purpose, no real life in the soldiers of democracy.

For this the soldiers deserve no special blame. They were an integral part of America. Their roots rested in a cynical sleepy culture that did not want to be waked up. In political thinking, there was no reason why the soldier should not agree with the half of Congress that was ready to send him home, with the Hoovers and Lindberghs and Wheelers who kept reiterating that we were in no danger. It was easy to accept the judgment that the President was evilly conspiring to get us into war, that there was as much to fear from Roosevelt as from Hitler.

The plain fact was that America knew little worth living or dying for, and the soldier was part of America.

He was non-religious. He had none of the fanatic faith of the Nazi, and Christianity was hardly a vigorous religion. Little wonder that he was not ready to throw himself into a grand effort where he could not reckon the percentage for himself.

The Army of Today

This listless army of yesterday received a powerful shot in the arm when war struck so completely and suddenly. The soldier was startled into wakefulness. Anger, pride, self-righteousness, racial prejudice, the feeling that the inevitable had arrived—these were mingled in the swift reaction to the Japanese attack. In twenty-four hours, old attitudes were scarcely recognizable. The army was ready to fight, to get "those slant-eyed sons of bitches," and get them hard.

It must be regarded as fortunate, that Hitler's declaration of war followed so quickly upon the Japanese attack. Much of America foolishly regarded it as a week-end lark to clean out the Japanese. The wiser leadership of Roosevelt and Hull, and the cooperation of Hitler, prevented us from running to joy-ride in the Pacific, overlooking the world implications of the Japanese attack.

The soldiers quickly came to realize that we are into the war up to our necks, and that we won't get out until the whole thing is settled. A grimmer undercurrent of feeling stabilized the first devil-may-care anger. The passions of the moment subsided a little, and a more realistic reckoning of what lay ahead emerged.

Morale, to the military mind which sees it only in terms of pride and desire for victory, is high. And the army now

would enter combat vigorously and follow its orders well.

But we must ask whether a morale so suddenly discovered, growing to a considerable degree out of anger and racial prejudice, is adequate, even in purely military terms. It is not enough for an army or a nation to find its temperature suddenly rising. For the real morale that withstands aggression heroically, we must think of the dogged resistance of the British in the months after Dunkerque, of the unbelievable determination of the Russians before Moscow and the Caucasus, of the infinite endurance of the Chinese under ten years of ruthless battering. For this, the American army—and America—is not prepared. Such a morale is perhaps not an impossibility. But it is not a reality.

There is some hope in the soldier. His new-found vigor is badly tainted with fanaticism. But he feels a thorough revulsion at the "patriotic" ballyhoo that streams from the radio. There's a soberness and grimness in his feelings. He knows it's no glorious adventure ahead. Perhaps from this may come something of a dogged determination to outlast the shot in the arm.

The Army of the Future

The morale that wins a war is rarely capable of building the peace. And this war may be no exception.

Throughout the ranks of the army there is little to give hope for the future. In political and economic terms, the average soldier is conservative with no vision of a new social order. (One gains a new respect for the achievements of the New Deal when he sees how little most men grasp of even

this limited ideal.) Of an international order, there is little dream.

If men bother to think about the maintenance of peace, their thoughts are in the direction of an American imperialism. Any notion of abridgment of national sovereignty is unthought of, and would be fiercely resented. Frequently bitter sentiments are heard: "Last time we didn't smash them hard enough, but this time we won't make that mistake." "At the end of this war, if any congressman talks about sending food over there, I'll shoot him myself."

These are the sentiments that strike the ear now. The Christian "interventionist" in the army suddenly finds himself no longer wishing to be a goad to action (though of a different quality from most of our goads) but longing to be a restraint on the hostile emotions threatening to run rampant. This is the strategy which many Christian leaders have anticipated, and the time for the change in emphasis is here. It is the more necessary because the suddenness of our entrance into the war has burnt the brakes that might have restrained us.

Thoughtful Christians, who have advocated our acceptance of world responsibility, have faced realistically the sordid elements which would inevitably enter such a program. But this previous realization makes the event no less painful. We have seen the terrible fruits of many of history's militarisms; we don't know whether we can escape the same sins and errors. We must ask the poignant question, "Cannot we escape complacency without rushing into fanaticism?" Americans have run the course from naive idealism to disillusioned cynicism. Now, can that disillusion be broken only by rampant hatreds? Is there no other choice?

There is a very real alternative. It is a dialectical Christianity, which sees the worth of a historical goal, and is willing to fight without stint for it, at the same time thoroughly recognizing its sinfulness. The man of faith need be no less ardent a fighter for freedom because he is a repentant fighter. This is the possibility. Its realization would mean a New World.

But no less than a complete cultural and religious renaissance can produce what we need. And this does not come from the wishing. The signs of the time are not happy; perhaps our era and our culture is doomed. But possibly it has a Destiny. Possibly there is in it yet the health to produce a new growth, unsmothered by the remains of the past. We are at the testing point now. Liberal idealism, and isolationism—sometimes idealistic and sometimes perverse—have by this time revealed their bankruptcy. Are there in the counterforces now released the vision and power that History demands? Only the years ahead will tell.

Certain it is that no counting of losses or recording of majority opinions will reveal this vision and power. America's army, the pulse of democracy, shows obviously the forces of destruction. But are the forces of growth there too, ready to emerge from the new-found vigor? In the sober realization of the struggle ahead, the willingness to give up complacency and face reality, harsh and painful, there is room for hope. Of this I am sure.

But the hope is not a strong one. Victory will mean something better than Nazism's triumph. That is a certainty. Whatever our inadequacies, our physical power alone can do much to destroy perverse tyranny and grant opportunity to the genuine forces for good that exist in Europe and Asia. This makes our effort worthwhile.

But will some real structure of the future rise from the wreckage of today? We don't know. And the explosiveness of the historic cataclysm of our day is so tremendous that our hopes and plans, though not to be despised, are mighty small.

We know that this is not just another 1914-18, another movement in the cycle of imperial rivalries. It is World Revolution. And its outcome cannot be planned or predicted. Plans and visions adequate to cause a new order are scarcely visible. But sometimes the God of Destiny overrules the God of Causality. God may turn the wrath of man to His higher ends.

History sometimes creates the leaders it demands. It may do so now. The future, we know, will be different from the past. It may be chaos and the uprooting of culture. It may be new life. Our job is to watch and pray, to do what is possible in building plans and ideals. Then the men may arise and the movement emerge which History will seize for the Future. Perhaps it is only a chance. But the God of History, and the God above History, demands it of us, and we can do no other.

THE INFERNO AND THE KINGDOM

By R. A. LANDOR

Hard to learn, and harder still to remember, are the depths and heights at which life is most itself—the realities of fury and of creation. When, in the plodding routine of days and years, these realities are suddenly come upon, who of us are able to confront them without vacancy or fear? How many are there who scorning habitually to measure life with a foot-rule, have lived so as to be able to face the pulsing days with surety? Where are the resources by which men succeed in neither ignoring nor destroying creation; and neither fleeing, nor seeking to appease, fury? How may man, confronted by catastrophe or revelation, anti-christ or Christ, find himself ready? If today the world faces catastrophe, Biblical faith know there are means by which the catastrophe may be overcome. Wherever catastrophe is present salvation is there too, for the deepest roots of salvation draw life from the blackest earth of despair.

Blitzkrieg is aimed at every nation and at every living heart. The fight against it must take place on two fronts: earth, air, and sea; and in the heart of man. If the fight is lost on the first front, it will almost surely be lost on the second too. If it is lost on the second front, it doesn't make much difference to win on the first. To win, we must win on both.

The blitzkrieg of military operations must be met, of course, by military operations. Hitler's real greatness, how-

ever, is in his evil. Hitler is a hero of Inferno, and a hero of the Inferno in each of us. It is a foolish thing to imagine that the depth of the pit, any more than the height of the stars, is easily reached. Evil is inertia and ignorance, but not simply these. The venture into the chill and dark of demonry demands vast powers of spirit, great elements of hate, lust, denial, treachery, and murder, unendurable to an ordinary man. Only a specialist or a genius could be equal to it. Hitler does what the ordinary man cannot do, even though he would, because he is in the purgatory of not being able to find himself in the reaches of either Hitler's depths, or the heights to which he is called by the Kingdom in each of us. Yet it is only by the Kingdom that the Inferno may be overcome.

Out of the Kingdom surge three springs. The first is study. While evil cannot be identified with ignorance, certainly there is an important relation between them. In study we may find the suggestion of what we can and must do when we learn what has been done and what there is which we may do. The very least, that the present owes to the future, is the understanding of the best of the past. To say the least, we shall not defend our culture any better for not knowing what it is. Hitler has found the confusion caused by this ignorance to be very helpful. If men do not know precisely what they mean by "democracy," "freedom,"

human dignity," their morale in the struggle for these things must be weaker than if they do know what they mean. If morale is as important in warfare as it seems to be, then national defense should include the study of that culture which we are preparing to defend.

The second is service. While evil cannot be identified with inertia, to choose inaction in a time when strong action is desperately needed is obviously very wrong. We know that life is meaningful. We know it because we can apprehend it; or because effect follows cause; or because there is growth; or because we suffer; or because the birth is the Lord's and the fullness thereof. The life, which is lived according to the true principles of life's meaning, no more doubts that life is worth living than the creator of a masterpiece doubts the existence of an essential difference between what is ugly and what is beautiful. The knowledge is wrapped up in the experience. We know it is better that life should be honored than debased, enriched than exploited. It makes a difference if men keep. Service is the recognition of, and acting upon, this difference. Service is the good fruit of the faith that life is meaningful and that history is serious. Without this faith any cause we serve rests upon sheer sentimentality. With this faith there is no question whether or when to serve, but only where.

The third is prayer. Just as we know in the experience of true living that life is meaningful, so do we know in deliverance from Inferno that we have not done it ourselves. Despair and disgust and confusion rob us of the peace and joy and strength which all believe to be their birthright. Our natural response to the restoration of this birthright is gratitude, prayer—and our way to this restoration is to confess what is only true, that we cannot do it ourselves alone. Prayer is first the seeking that we may find; and second the gratitude for having found. Prayer is when or where we receive the promised gift of the certain knowledge of being loved by the Creator and Judge. It is in prayer alone, that that of evil which is not ignorance or inertia may be met and, at least partly, vanquished.

In deepening days of crisis, anxiety grows. When men are sufficiently anxious they will seize the nearest (i.e., the easiest) preserver, no matter how rotten. So did Germany, after Versailles, embrace Hitler. It is necessary to beat Hitler on one front with his own kind of weapons; but to beat him on the other, the front of the Inferno, in which he is a master, we must use the resources of the Kingdom. From the spring of study our efforts may be informed; from the spring of service our strength may be increased; and from the spring of prayer this nation, under God, may be united.

AN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR NEGROES

by SAM H. FRANKLIN, Jr.

This institute was held on the Providence Cooperative Farm, November 11 to 16, 1941 under the auspices of the Providence Cooperative Association, an organization of Negroes living in the neighborhood of the Providence Cooperative Farm, which aims at community improvement along religious, educational, economic, and public health lines. Crafts and cooking classes were held in the forenoon and all other lectures and demonstration periods were in the afternoon and evening. A plate supper was served at a cost of ten cents. The meetings were held in the community building of the Providence Cooperative Farm which was erected by volunteer labor of Negroes and whites a year ago. The daily attendance was between forty-five and fifty. A majority of those who came were stable citizens of the community of recognized character and leadership. The county agent of this county, who spoke to the institute, pointed out that we have one of the highest percentages of Negro farmers of any county in the state. Even though these people live on very poor eroded farms with a present income that is little more than one of starvation proportions, they are more free to apply the instruction of an institute like ours than the highly mobile sharecroppers of the Delta.

The results of the institute in all its phases were highly gratifying. We had the benefit of leadership from seven

outstanding Negroes who came to us from the Tuskegee Institute, the Farm Security Administration, and Jackson College. In addition, members of the staff of the two farms, including Mr. and Mrs. Ira Hatch, Mrs. Lindsey Cox, our nurse at Rochdale, Mr. Checkver, our storekeeper at Providence, and Mr. Charles Merrill who is assisting in the store, Mr. Russell, farm manager at Providence, and Mrs. Franklin, and myself conducted classes. There was great interest in the craft work, one or two rugs being woven on the loom belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Hatch, while the institute was going on. The crafts teacher from Jackson College gave instruction in making such articles as paper window shades, rugs of grain sacks, and cornshuck mats. Several girls attended the cooking classes and prepared meals of low cost foods.

No feature was more practical than the study and demonstration of better farming methods. Some of the Negro leaders were pitilessly realistic in drawing attention to characteristics all too commonly found among Negro tenant farmers, such as the failure to provide door steps, dumping wood in the front yard, destroying fences for kindling, and tolerating unsanitary wells. While they dwelt upon things like this, they were always constructive and managed to keep the good-will of their hearers. The agriculturist from Jackson declared that everyone should have at

least six vegetables growing in his garden at present, but found almost none of whom this was true. The county agent said that in a survey of 250 Negro families in Holmes County last year, half did not have sweet potatoes by the first of the year. He reminded everyone of the increasing importance of home produced food and cautioned them not to sell corn now for it will bring nearly double the price next spring.

Various leaders gave a thorough rounded presentation of cooperative processes. Several expressed a desire to proceed with the Association's plans for a credit union, and at the end of the institute a sweet potato producer cooperative, using land on the Providence Cooperative Farm, was projected. It was helpful to have the story of the Gary Consumers Cooperative from their organizer, President Reddix of Jackson College, as their experience at many points has been similar to our own.

One of the aims of the institute was to bring to these underprivileged Negroes a knowledge of the new government services now available to them. At least ten of these, including the S.A., the C.C.C., the N.Y.A. and production and seed loans were set forth in detail. The thrilling achievements of the Farm Security Administration, especially in cooperative projects like Mileston, were of great interest.

The health hour each day was of vital importance and very popular. I have no doubt that dozens of people went away with a new understanding of malaria, gained from an excellent movie film, as well as from the nurse's talk, and of tuberculosis and venereal disease. A special meeting was arranged

for women only, and by request the subject of birth control was dealt with.

The whole institute was held against a background of deep religious faith and real experience of group worship. An unusually gifted Negro minister accomplished results in his leadership of group singing that a graduate of Westminster choir might envy. I have never heard spirituals and hymns of the Negro church sung with greater feeling by an untrained group. The daily worship services were an attempt to relate the objectives of community betterment to the Christian concept of faith in action. On the last night the service took on something of the character of a Negro revival service following a panel in which the problem of young people leaving home had been discussed. In the course of one long prayer, personal and group confession of failure to provide adequately for the young people of the community was spontaneously outpoured.

The most significant aspect of the institute for me is the suggestion it holds for more systematic educational work on the farm in the future. I was impressed by the enthusiasm of professional educators for this type of free approach to practical community problems. Several assured me that a kind of folk school conducted on this same plane would be of great value. President Reddix declared in his closing address that it was the hope of work like this which brought him back to the South. He also spoke favorably of the possibility of a permanent relationship between the farm and the college, with students of the latter doing practice work in connection with a folk school on the farm.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE CHURCH AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER, *by William Paton*. MacMillan Co., \$1.50.

Dr. Paton, speaking at one point of the work of another writer, refers to it as "his luminous little book." This description could be made even more emphatically of this volume. This reviewer cannot recall when he has found so much practical good sense, political understanding and Christian insight combined in so small a compass. It is not that Dr. Paton says anything particularly startling; certainly readers of *Christianity and Society* will not find anything especially new. It is rather that here in a brief one hundred eighty-eight pages, there is distilled the best realistic Christian thinking about "after the peace, what?" in a fresh, stimulating and easily digestible form.

Isolationists, purists, and so forth, probably will not like it. Dr. Paton takes as his first assumption a clear cut victory by the democracies and consequently assumes that the war must be prosecuted to that end. He has no faith in a negotiated peace. He also deals realistically with the problem of power, and recognizes that there can be no government without power. The problem is how to keep that power in check.

Dr. Paton believes that, unless we consider statecraft utterly fatalistic and mechanistic, it is of the utmost importance what principles are used to solve the problem of power. At this point, he believes, the Church (i.e. the community of all believers in Jesus Christ) has something to say and should say it.

The author over and over again states his recognition that no political arrangement will be perfect, nor ever produce the Kingdom of God, but he also is opposed to those who believe that no improvement can be made in the secular order until the "Second Coming." His closing chapters on the "Church and Human Worth" and "Freedom"; "Law and Understanding"; "Forgiveness and Power" are provocative and thrilling reading. In them Dr. Paton draws upon his wide experience as Secretary for the International Missionary Council.

Since the New Order must be based on power, the problem, as noted, is to keep that power in check, or at least relatively in check. This can be done, argues Dr. Paton, only where the power of government recognizes certain moral laws above it, and accepts in written law certain checks and obligations on the use of its power, both toward its own citizens and toward other nations. This, says Dr. Paton, is the "tradition of the West" and now United States and Great Britain are the champions and custodians of this tradition. (The author recognizes that in time China may become a custodian of this tradition, and, although writing before the attack on Russia, he recognizes in Communism at least some elements of affinity with the democracies). The new world order must frankly be built up as a close cooperation of the Democracies with Britain and America providing the core of power. He implies, although he does not say so, perhaps because of fear of arousing isolationist

entiment in both countries that a union of these two countries would be highly desirable. Other nations committed to the same principles would be welcomed into this system on an equal moral basis, but obviously could not have the military might to contribute. Such a summary does not do justice to Dr. Paton's argument. He deals realistically with such colonies as India, with the Jews, and Religious Freedom.

In order to establish such a world system there are three intermediate steps. The first is to get a settlement in which "Such words as 'freedom' and 'justice' can be used without irony." This means, of course, victory over the Axis Powers. Secondly, and this is an exceedingly valuable suggestion, there should be an interval of not less than one year, and preferably three years, between the military victory and the final peace conference. Thirdly, there should be full recognition that what is done in this interval will profoundly affect the terms of the final peace. In this regard, Dr. Paton believes that the dismemberment of Germany would be a tragedy and advocates keeping it united with adequate access to world trade, but under a police control until it became ready to accept responsibility for government under law.

Minor criticisms might be made. Dr. Paton, for some of his argument, seems to lean too heavily on the public statements of statesmen like Chamberlain, Halifax, Churchill and Roosevelt. But this is a side issue. Both in its political realism and in its Christian understanding and conviction, this book is a gold mine for all who are concerned either about the future of the Church or the nature of our world.

W. BURNET EASTON, JR.

THE PASSING OF THE SAINT: A STUDY OF A CULTURAL TYPE.

by John M. Mecklin. The University of Chicago Press. Chicago, 1941. 206 pp. Index., \$2.00.

John M. Mecklin, Professor of Sociology at Dartmouth, is one of the most interesting non-sympathetic authors writing on Christianity today. The term non-sympathetic is not quite correct because Professor Mecklin does have some sympathy. He knows more about historical theology and has more insight into its meaning than many Christians. Sometimes his insight is so incisive that one cannot but feel grateful to him for clarifying the Christian Faith. But—and this is what fascinates and irritates the reader—Mecklin then rejects it. His rejection is often arbitrary: he mutters something about "dogmatic fictions" or "word magic" and lets it go at that. Perhaps the fundamental reason the reader is fascinated and irritated at the same time is that Mecklin himself is attracted and repelled at the same time. This may be accounted for, in part at least, by Mecklin's personal history. There can be no doubt that he is a man of deep religious instincts as well as great intellectual vigor. Because of his liberalism, he was hounded out of Lafayette College, I believe it was, by the Fundamentalist heresy-hunters. Being a deeply religious man he could not simply shrug the matter off as a purely intellectual man might have done. It is not too far-fetched to suggest that he was ousted from his spiritual home and now he wanders upon the earth. Liberal Protestantism was too superficial for him; yet orthodoxy, or neo-orthodoxy, resembles too much the Fundamentalism which he revolted against and which,

probably, showed him little Christian charity.

This is speculation to be sure; but it is well to have some such interpretation in mind when one approaches his book. The same attitude of understanding and rejection, fascination and repulsion, underlies all his books. This is true of *The Story of American Dissent*—a brilliant book, the best thing on American Christianity for the period it covers (up to the early nineteenth century). Other of his books with which I am acquainted—*The Survival Value of Christianity*, *The Story of the Ku Klux Klan*, *An Introduction to Social Ethics*—are well worth reading though they too are crotchety, even a little peevish in spots. This most recent book, *The Passing of the Saint*, is second only to *The Story of American Dissent* on both counts.

The book tells the story of the saint from the time of the primitive church until the present day. The greatest amount of space is naturally given to the Middle Ages, with chapters on St. Augustine, St. Bernard, and St. Francis. He shows with precision and insight how the saint was related to society, how the church captured and used the saint for good and for evil. He shows also how saintly humility and ascetic scourging of the self turned into institutional selfishness: "To despise and humiliate the humanistic and secular self was for Bernard entirely proper—nay, necessary. But the obverse side of his humility was an exaggerated self-respect and pride from the point of view of the institutionalized self. In fact, extremes in one universe of discourse tended to breed extremes in the opposite." He goes on to speak of "the subtle dangers that inhere in an exaggerated

institutional self with its intolerance, its moral obtuseness, its obscurantism, its sublimated spiritual hates," saying truly, in reference to Bernard's hounding of Abelard, "there is no vindictiveness like that of a religion born of a dehumanized love."

It is not to be supposed from these quotations that Mecklin is completely unfair to St. Bernard. He shows a rare insight into the Saint's religious life and the deeply human sympathy which he too often curbed. Quite rightly he condemns the extremes of self-contempt to which Bernard went; but one wishes that he might have made reference to Bernard's four stages of love: The first being self-love, next love to God for one's own sake, thirdly love to God for His sake, and the fourth of loving one's self for God's sake—to which Bernard adds: "I know not if the fourth is perfectly attained by any man in this life." (See Harton, *The Elements of the Spiritual life*, p. 54; or Randall, *The Making of the Modern Mind*, p. 71. For the problem involved see also Eric Fromm's brilliant article, "Selfishness and Self-Love" in *Psychiatry*, November, 1939).

Mecklin goes on to treat St. Bernard in relation to the late Middle Ages, and the Puritan Saint in relation to the rise of the middle-class and "the great Capitalistic Democratic Myth." He adds to Tawney's evidence, in opposition to Weber's thesis, that the ethic of Protestantism had to be corrupted before it became the informing spirit of capitalism. He discusses briefly the relation of the "secular saint," in the persons of Voltaire, Jefferson and Lincoln, to the modern world, concluding that there is really no place for saintliness today because of the shabbiness of our culture:

Man's higher loyalties are only real and effective when embodied in a way of life. This is especially true of religion. Vital religion is, from its very nature, both comprehensive and ultimate. We have made religion personal, sectarian and impotent . . . The result is that men have been forced more or less to make religions out of the lower interests of life. We have the religion of party loyalty, the religion of science, the religion of education, and, worst of all, the religion of business. To give to orient human loyalties in terms of these lower levels is to stullify the meaning and value of life itself. The inevitable tendency is to make existence 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.' The august Christian tradition has degenerated into hundreds of innumerable middle-class cults that bear a strange family resemblance to the futile cults of the late Roman Empire." Whether or not one completely agrees with this analysis, it contains too much truth to be dismissed. Also while we speak in prophetic terms of Judgment, Repentance, and Redemption we must remember that Redemption must be registered in history, in a new society; so Mecklin's insights into the relation of the saint to society are important. He says: "There is probably nothing this mad world, seemingly bent on suicide, so desperately needs as a re-birth of the spirit of social solidarity incarnated in St. Francis."

Mecklin is not so optimistic as to believe that this can be readily achieved. Indeed he says little or nothing about how to achieve it. What he does say is much too secularistic and humanistic: "... man must out of his own spirit build 'the city which hath foundations.'" Here Christianity has something

to teach Mecklin (but he probably will not listen). Much of the spiritual strength which the English people are showing is, if we are to believe accounts, to be attributed to the fact that they view this war in terms of Judgment and, consequently, they have also known Redemption: through a profound faith they have found newness of life. The relevance of "the great Christian Myth" still remains.

There are many points, some large and some small, with which one might take issue. Some minor statements cast a shadow over Mecklin's usually impeccable scholarship. St. Augustine did not call the Donatists heretics; he called them schismatics. The easy identification of Pauline Christianity with the Mystery Religions will cause many a raised eyebrow and make one wonder if the author is aware of recent books on the subject, such as those of Angus and C. H. Dodd. He gives no references at all. (And it will make all Union Seminary students wish that Mecklin might have a little session with Dr. James E. Frame).

The constant use of the phrase "word magic" makes one suspect that the author himself needs a lesson in semantics. Too often he uses the phrase without trying to analyze what is meant by such words as Judgment and Redemption. He does not follow the logic of rigid semanticism into logical positivism; and yet he shows no real understanding of the meaning of religious symbols. He speaks often of "the great Christian Myth;" he even speaks of the necessity of myth in general in order for man to understand his life; but then he implies that one can deal with ultimate issues without recourse to myth. However, this is not consistently car-

ried out; being a sociologist he takes very seriously Mannheim's doctrine of the sociology of knowledge, and he even goes so far as to accept Mead's theory of the social origin of mind—a doctrine which, if consistently maintained, contradicts itself. (See R. Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, p. 56, footnote). Mecklin writes: "A man's ideas cannot possibly rise higher than the ideas derived from his social heritage." If so, how did the social heritage get to be what it is? However, it should be added that even when one disagrees emphatically with Mecklin, his insights into the sociological character of religious ideas, the constellations of reason (Tillich's phrase) in history, add to one's understanding of *mytho-logos*.

The book deserves a place on the shelf with studies of the relation of the prophet to society, the relation of the sect to the church, and of the church to society. Finally, let it be said, that it is the kind of book about Christianity written by a non-Christian which should be read and studied: it puts one on one's mettle not only because of the author's intellectual penetration but also because of his moral vigor and religious sincerity.

RICHARD W. DAY.

FAITH AND NURTURE, *by* H. Shelton Smith. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. \$2.00.

"Religious education has two roots," writes H. Shelton Smith, "one being modern education and the other modern religion." (p. 40) The author regards both roots as weak foundations for *Christian* nurture, since the former by outspoken admission is "anthropocentric religion" and the latter stands

in need of critical reconsideration and revision. The testimony of this root illness of Protestant nurture is given, not by an outsider, but by the Professor of Religious Education at Duke University who has made his career *Christian Nurture*. Professor Smith sets as his purpose, "to raise into sharp relief certain basic aspects of Christian faith which seem either to be ignored or else inadequately incorporated in the modern theory of liberal religious nurture." (Preface)

Let it be said at the beginning, that despite what friend or foe will say about Dr. Smith's book, he has the fullest appreciation of what he believes to have been the contributions of modern thought, both secular and religious, to the problem of religious nurture. He has no intention of going back to "the good old days" of "rule by the rod." What he does is to point to the *Christian* faith with the urgent appeal that religious education become in truth, what it claims in theory, i.e., to be both *Christian* and progressive.

The present century has witnessed a revival of interest in religious education which is almost phenomenal. While this interest was stimulated by the development of science, it is also the fruit of new modes of religious life and thought which emerged during the nineteenth century. Now certain aspects of the modern theory of religious education are being challenged by later insights in theology. But many religious educators are not receptive to criticism. Dr. Smith regrets that this is the attitude of some of his colleagues. He feels that it "gives little promise of revitalizing the educational movement of the Protestant churches." (p. 3)

Liberalism is the outgrowth of cer-

in tendencies developed before the beginning of this century. The thought of men like William E. Channing, Theodore Parker, and Horace Bushnell is decisive. Four historic tendencies are noted. (1) *Divine immanence* came as a protest against the Calvinistic principle of discontinuity. (2) *Growth* of religion in the individual, in the race, and as a method of achieving change, came central to the new liberal faith. (3) Emphasis upon the *goodness of God* as opposed to doctrines of human depravity, defined sin as wickedness and attributed wickedness to false education. The whole development directed a new emphasis upon (4) the *historical Jesus*.

Professor George A. Coe played a most important role in translating the tendencies of liberal faith into terms of modern religious education. Under his guiding spirit, Protestant education has followed the trail blazed by its predecessors. What were once tendencies have become canonized in present-day religious education.

By way of examination, the author focuses attention upon the social theory of Liberalism from the point of view of the underlying doctrine of the Kingdom of God. It has become commonplace in liberal thought to speak of the Kingdom of God as "the Democracy of God." The assumption is that the Kingdom of God is construable in terms of an ideal social order. This assumption involves two rather basic ideas, that the form of the Kingdom is a universal society of persons and its dynamic is ethical love between persons. The emphasis upon the human side of the Kingdom in modern thought, leads Professor Smith to ask whether it is not merely the Kingdom of man rather than the Kingdom of

God. The author feels that the emphasis upon "the personality principles as it has been developed in modern religious thought, has not preserved adequately the theocentric nature of the Kingdom." (p. 39)

Certain tendencies which reflect a humanitarian doctrine of the Kingdom are considered. The emphasis upon the value of persons has easily led to the principle that the infinite worth of persons is the basic element in the Christian faith. This principle has become almost an obsession with the modern religious educator. And yet it is precisely among those who value man from this point of view that the divine ground of human value is obscured. Another serious implication of this view is the tendency to equate the value of man to his value of humanity. Professor Smith remarks significantly, "with their transcendent value denied or obscured, the way is open to subordinating persons to whatever social system may be dominant." (p. 44) Another tendency which distorts the real meaning of the Kingdom of God is that which identifies religion with the process of discovering the ethical meaning and worth of persons. Such a view grounds reality in social interaction. It obscures the theocentric meaning of the Kingdom by implicitly denying God as the ultimate reality. This view tends to identify the experience of God with a certain mode or quality of human striving, which puts a premium upon the intensity with which one pursues social interaction. It would appear that this attitude is the source of some impatience on the part of religious educators who, like us all, have forgotten the specific command of Jesus: "Be not anxious."

What about the doctrine of man and its relation to Christian nurture? "It is our claim," writes H. Shelton Smith, "that man is a theonomous being. That is to say, he is a being who is created 'in the image of God'. This signifies that man can be truly understood only from the divine perspective." (p. 69) Needless to say, much religious educational theory is cast in naturalistic terms. Such men as Dewey, Ames, Wieman and Bower have had decisive influence at this point. The notion of a source of human existence outside the natural process is thus rejected. What source there may be is grounded in social interaction. The Christian doctrine of human value based on creation by God stands in sharp contrast to this theory of human value dependent upon natural forces. It follows that Christianity insists in contrast to secular theories that man is not an end in himself. His "true meaning is never realized in terms of purely human community, but only in terms of a reality that is the creative ground of all life and all community." (p. 82) As for the nature of community, those who base their understanding of man on naturalism regard the bond of community as inhering in man's social nature, and the dynamic of community as arising out of the love of man for man. But the Christian community binds men together as sons of God and bases its dynamic in the love of God's children. A clear understanding of the issues in this conflict will serve to strengthen the Christian position in the present crisis.

The problem of Divine initiative presents some embarrassment to modern religious educators. For there is implied in every naturalistic philosophy of progressive nurture, as Professor Smith

puts it, "the assumption that all 'revelations' are relative, and that disclosure of the ultimate meaning of life must necessarily be reserved to some future moment in the history of mankind." (p. 107) Such a view fosters the opinion that all truth is tentative. But the Christian faith is based on the fundamental assumption that God revealed in Jesus Christ the ultimate meaning and destiny of human existence. History was given a religious center in Jesus Christ.

Professor Smith finds that religious educators, and Protestants in general, are particularly vague about the meaning the Church. He attributes this to the general tendency which fosters the distinction between "educational" activities and "Church" activities. The Church is the community of Christian nurture. It partakes of the relative forms of imperfect society. But it is by no means the product of any social order. Attention must always be given to both the social and the supra-social aspects of the Church, if it is to be fully appreciated. The discussion is climaxed with a dramatic and powerful appeal for a more realistic Gospel, based on the fact that man does not fulfill the law of love. The author writes, "When man from the very depths of his frustrated self says, '*Who shall deliver me from this death?*', is it enough for the religious educator to implore him to be more loving? . . . No! . . . In this (Christian) view, man's contradiction is ultimately resolved, not by man's ability to love and to forgive, but by a Divine Mercy which, through Christ, absorbs into itself the sins of the truly repentant sinners. Thus 'by Grace have ye been saved through faith!'" (p. 172)

In the last chapter of this book the author turns to a consideration of the ethical and religious implications of the philosophy of modern or progressive education, sometimes called "experimental" or "democratic" education. Suffice it to say that the opposition of this point of view to the Christian religion can only be explained by the fact that its method implies a clearly recognizable prior religion. It is anthropocentric religion. It is true as Professor Smith points out in conclusion, with regard to the teaching of the Hebrew Christian faith in the public school, that "the question is not as many have supposed, 'Shall the public school teach religion?' . . . Thus the paramount question is this: what kind of religion shall the public school teach—the religion of the Church, or the religion of humanistic experimentalism." (p. 202)

This book has been long expected. I hope that its acceptance will be as wide as the need for it.

CHARLES R. STINETTE, JR.

THE CRISIS OF OUR AGE, *by P. A. Sorokin*. Dutton. \$3.50.

The thesis of this book by the head of the sociology department of Harvard, is that human history oscillates between three types of culture, the "ideational", the "idealistic", and the "sensate". These three cultures correspond roughly to Comte's theological, metaphysical, and scientific age. Sorokin defines them, however, with a quite unbelievable crudeness. A religious culture is defined as if all religions were naively otherworldly, and a naturalistic culture is described as if all naturalism were crudely mechanistic.

Amidst these oscillations we are now in the final period of a sensate culture,

which began in the 16th century. One might imagine that a Luther and a Calvin had never existed in that century.

It is not quite clear whether Sorokin regards a naturalistic age as of itself evil, or whether it is only its final decay which produces confusion. At any rate we are in the period of the decay of the sensate culture, and we need not, therefore, worry about Hitler, or tyranny, or war, for we may confidently look forward to a new "ideational" culture. Sometimes it seems that we ought to do something about bringing it to birth; but then again we find ourselves quite safely riding the pendulum of history, and it seems that nothing in particular can be done.

This book is supposed to be one of those great contributions of a "scientist" to the cause of religion. The Lord save us from our friends. This is a fatuous book which ought to be put by the side of that other great scientific defense of religion Link's "The Return to Religion." One dreads to think of the number of sermons which will be based upon this book, if the Link book may be regarded as an index.

R. N.

THE HUMAN ENTERPRISE. An Attempt to Relate Philosophy to Daily Life, *by Max Otto*. F. S. Crofts & Co., New York, 1940. Pp. IX, 385. \$2.25.

I know of no other book that has been as successful as this one in bringing philosophic thought into vital connection with the problems of everyday life. Neither William James nor John Dewey have been as successful in making the pragmatic point of view as wide-ranging in meaning as this brilliantly written work by the head of

the department of philosophy of the University of Wisconsin. Professor Otto is the clearest thinker among those who have espoused a naturalistic, anti-metaphysical, and scientific humanism. No trained philosopher, theologian, or social scientist can afford to miss becoming intimately conversant with the contents of this remarkable volume, whether he agrees or not with the general viewpoint advocated. Every type of mind will find the author's insistence on the central significance of the human enterprise in terms of reverence for personality unusually enriching, revealing and challenging. The work as a whole is a fine illustration of how recondite problems in philosophy can be meaningfully related to the living problems of men. Otto pleads upon the basis of a splendid discussion of the functioning of human ideals in daily life for a realistic idealism, a moral idealism, that is socially and scientifically enlightened. He has both affirmative and negative things to say about philosophers in particular, science and scientists, organized religion and the dignitaries of the cloth. Theologians in the professional sense, ministers and priests, will find chapter X and XI to be especially addressed to them. They should welcome these sections; for even though they may not concur with the author's central ideas, yet, if their hearts and minds are honest, they will appreciate the truths of some of the indictments registered against atheistic moral behavior among professional religionists.

A study of dynamic atheism leads Otto to make the necessary distinction between metaphysical and ethical atheism. Men who are far apart in their beliefs about God may be committed

to very similar social and ethical ideals. Philosophers, scientists and bishops, who differ in the theistic interpretation of the cosmos, may concur in their objection against a moral atheism. But many people whose main objection is to ethical atheism insist that they are really against cosmic atheism, a situation which the author frankly deplures, and thinks does not follow. An honest non-theist may be socially idealistic in his program of life, while a perfunctory theist, whether journalist or cardinal, may be dominated by socially materialistic ambitions. I grant that there are many perfunctory theists who are ethically atheistic in behavior. But who knows whether there are not proportionately as many cosmic atheists who are also ethically atheistic? True the moral passion was deeply ingrained in the writings of a metaphysically atheistic Marx, Trotsky, Max Adler, and many others. But the same moral passion permeated with equal intensity the sermons of generations of devout rabbis and ministers prior to the rise of modern cosmic atheism. The professed atheism of the leaders of proletarian socialism, even if accepted at its face value, is explicable in the light of the historical alliance of the official churches with the socially reactionary forces. But it is equally true, that in essence, religion has also often been as revolutionary a force as any. The proletariat has unquestionably more deep-rooted religious leanings. It has learned more humility and courageous acknowledgment of life's tragic burden. It has developed a deep sense of social solidarity and recognized more readily the value of authority and discipline than the individualistic, free-thinking bourgeoisie of our time. There was a deeper justi-

cation for the anti-religious upheaval of middle-class Enlightenment and rejection of reason than for the godlessness of contemporary communism.

The greatest danger to religion comes not from convinced metaphysical atheists, but from the ethical atheists among the perfunctory devotees of official, institutionalized religion. Those who feel that religion, though superfluous for themselves, is necessary for the people and the maintenance of public order and the security of their own position, are religion's true enemies. Reckless optimistic theists take cheap comfort from the fact that religion has successfully weathered the storm of Enlightenment, empiricism, extreme individualism, liberalism, and various other isms of modern life. The main enemy of religion is not science and the new discoveries, not the prevalent religious indifference, not the rival religious trends. The proletarian nontheistic creed of Russian communists, the resurrected paganism, especially of Germany, threaten all established religious bodies. Secularism, under the guise of nationalism, beclouds the future outlook of religion.

Living religion has not relegated salvation to the Hereafter, but constantly strives for the betterment of the human race in the world. The function of theism is to goad lazy believers on to more creative endeavors. It can dispense with a generally accepted system of dogmas, if not necessarily with a number of dogmas. It avoids laying down any dogmatic creed which crowds out all those who cherish different conceptions. Creative religion has on previous occasions discarded its superannuated conceptions of God, and it can do so again.

We of today are an easy-going lot.

In laying stress upon comforts, life's tragic implications are easily forgotten. Only as we learn again to sacrifice all for the sake of our convictions, religious or secular, have we truly taken hold of our ideal in perpetuity. The readiness for suffering wherever necessary, and the joyous affirmation in all other occasions—this is perhaps the kernel of religious and ethnic survival. Organized religion must reread its profession of faith in the light of both past history and present needs, thus retaining historical continuity in the midst of the most radical adaptations; must reestablish that fine link between the individual and the community which will reawaken in its membership the sense of discipline and voluntary obedience to the supreme postulates of its spiritual community and historic heritage and destiny. The full realization of the great aims of religion will come through processes of history. Manifest victory is often really defeat, and apparent surrender the mark of actual conquest. The impotence of man as an instrument of an almighty power in achieving the ultimate, truly decisive victory over nature, is the core of historic religion. Both Judaism and Christianity are this-worldly religions, whose central emphasis is upon the destinies of mankind. In their creative phases they always have laid stress upon sanctified pursuits performed in the spirit of service to family, nation and all of mankind. HERMAN HAUSHEER.

SOMETHING ABOUT KIERKEGAARD, *by David Swenson*. Augsburg Publishing House. \$1.50.

THOUGHTS ON CRUCIAL SITUATIONS IN HUMAN LIFE, *by Soren Kierkegaard*. \$2.50.

The late Professor Swenson was America's greatest authority on Kierkegaard. Unfortunately he was a perfectionist who was never quite ready to publish anything because it was not as perfect as he wanted it to be. After his death his wife, together with Dr. Lowrie, brought out his translation of Kierkegaard's "Unscientific Postscript" briefly reviewed in our last issue. Now Mrs. Swenson has published not only some translations of Kierkegaard's minor works, but also unpublished essays on Kierkegaard by Swenson which are of the highest value in giving us a key to the understanding of all of Kierkegaard's works, which will be pretty fully translated and made available to American readers before another year is up.

One interesting and basic aspect of Kierkegaard's thought is revealed in both these essays and in Swenson's interpretation. It is Kierkegaard's emphasis upon the "vertical" character of the God-man relationship, which excludes all other dimensions of thought and reality for him. Thus repentance is repentance before God and all social calculations of sin obscure real contrition. Thus he writes in a sermon for a confessional service: "When you fast my dear reader, anoint your head and wash your face, then you will be neither distracted by seeing others more guilty, nor by seeing others less guilty. And do not do in public what is a common undertaking, but rightly in secret. Oh, it is much easier to look to the right or the left than to look into oneself."

In the same manner he emphasizes the unique responsibility of each individual before God: "If it were not true that one man might under the same circumstances do just the opposite of

that which is right for another man to do, and both be equally honest, sincere, just, and God-fearing, then the God-relation would not exist, not essentially, and not in its deepest significance. If one could pass judgment upon every human being in accordance with a general standard, then God would be abolished and everything would culminate as in paganism in society or the state." Professor Swenson, though a philosopher, has a religious appreciation of the depth of this religious individualism.

Whether Kierkegaard does justice to what men hold in common, as well as to what makes each man unique in the sight of God, is another question. Surely there are more valid "natural law" standards in human society and history, than he allows for.

Professor Swenson's chapter on Kierkegaard's "Existential Dialectic" is as clear a statement of the meaning of this dialectic as has come to my attention. He writes: "The Hegelian dialectic is relevant to an observer contemplating the world process; the existential dialectic is relevant to an individual who confronts the future as an active participant in life. The two points of view yield a contrasting consciousness. A merely contemplative consciousness sees nowhere any absolute oppositions; and this is the reason why Hegelian dialectic registers a compromise, or synthesis of opposites which is supposed to preserve the essence of both, while annihilating them in their separateness. Its watchword is "both -and". The existential dialectic operates with qualitative distinctions and discovers absolute disjunctions which cannot be mediated. Its watchword, therefore, is: "'Either-Or'."

There are insights in Kierkegaard which would be of tremendous help to many a modern liberal religionist in the present moment. They would save them from the moral futility and from perverse moral perfectionism, which have bedeviled the liberal movement of our day. As Professor Swenson writes: "When the individual takes himself out of existence and contemplates himself as he is, statically, he perceives that he is both good and bad. But when he again plunges into existence and confronts the future ethically he cannot become good or bad at the same time, but must move in one direction or the other. The ethical relativist either occupies the irrelevant standpoint of a disinterested observer, in which case he cannot see the issue, or he is bankrupt of ethical enthusiasm. Without the passion of subjectivity, there are nowhere any decisive distinctions in life."

Professor Swenson's interpretations of Kierkegaard are so lucid and profound that they deserve the widest possible reading. They are to be commended particularly to the large number of religious people who intend to become better acquainted with Kierkegaard, now that his books are appearing in English.

R. N.

A CREED FOR FREE MEN, by William Adams Brown. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York. xiii-277 pp. \$2.50.

In America, there are thousands of persons who are neither devoutly Christian nor confessedly non-Christian. They have not begun to think in terms of sin and tragedy (with Niebuhr and others), but they are increasingly aware of these elements in their present. They have imbibed what Lippmann has

called the acids of modernity yet they have not entirely forsaken their religious heritage. They believe in democracy without great clarity in regard to its principles or its demands. They are the product of a Christian culture which is not aware of its Christian roots. They are, nevertheless, real persons, children of God and candidates for the Christian understanding of God and man. From them there must be drawn a large part of the power for the struggle toward a democratic world.

To these thousands, Dr. Brown has written a book in their own language. It looks at life as they see it, it presupposes what they presuppose, it begins with the ideals to which they give allegiance. It understands their attitude toward science and religion and their now disillusioned credulity about the powers of science. It speaks to them about God and society, in terms which they find in their newspapers and illustrates its argument with experiences and men which come from similar sources. And in so doing, the book reveals the author's amazing ability to speak to the place where his type of readers are. But he goes farther than that. He leads these readers deeper into an understanding of man as a creature of conflict set in a universe curtained with mystery. Internal and social conflict and mystery are revealed in such a way as not to frighten and this means, of course, the foregoing of depths. Democracy is shown to be a way of life which fits the nature of the universe and of man better than the short-cuts of Communism and Nazism which do not arrive at the promised destinations. And throughout it all, Dr. Brown is steadily witnessing to the fact that Christianity holds the final key to the

problem of human conflict, the success of democracy, and the meaning of life. The reader whom he has chosen, therefore, will come away from the book with life illumined, with a renewed faith in democracy and with a new sense of the relevance and truthfulness of the Christian religion.

To do what he intended Dr. Brown has deliberately limited himself. This is the genius of the book. If one wants Dr. Brown's full grasp of Christian meaning, his powers as apologist and witness for the Christian religion and the democratic tradition, one may go elsewhere in his writings. Yet *A Creed for Free Men* could not have been written except by the author of those other books. Its proportion, balance, awareness of where issues lie, deftness and confident statements reveal its rich background. An illustration will suffice to show this. In regard to the moderns' dilemma about miracles, Dr. Brown writes,

"In the scientific sense a miracle is an event that cannot be brought under natural law. In the religious sense, it is an event that brings to an individual or a social group some message from God."

"The fact that wider experience has shown that many of these events have a natural explanation need not shake the religious man's conviction that they have a message for him from God . . ."

Here is deftness of distinction, decision with confidence born of study, thought and a sense of what is religious and what is not. Such things Liberal Theology gave us and we do not want to lose them.

For those of us who know Dr. Brown personally and owe much to his mind and to his personal influence, this book testifies to the evangelical fire which

will never wane in his spirit. He has not closed his career with his semi-retirement from theological teaching. He has turned back to the people with his message. And as always he teaches us not only what to do but also how to do it.

A. T. MOLLEGEN.

BOOKS ON DEMOCRACY

Politics and Law in the United States, by D. W. Brogan, Cambridge University Press. \$1.00.

The Democratic Tradition in America, by T. V. Smith. Farrar and Rinehart, \$1.50.

New Liberties for Old, by Carl Becker, Yale University Press. \$2.00.

Each of these little volumes has a distinctive quality and a distinct merit. Professor Brogan, as a sympathetic British observer, traces our constitutional history, and is anxious about the fact that not only our constitution but all our political ideals which the constitution enshrines, tend to make our government one of "law rather than men," to such a degree that our forms are too inflexible to meet unique occasions or to provide for extraordinary stresses.

Professor Becker, who is an authority upon the eighteenth century rationalism, which produced these ideas of government, seeks to separate what is valid in our democratic idealism from the eighteenth century illusion that, "reason was a bit of universal intelligence placed within each individual man." He wants to abandon the "temple in which the democratic ideology was originally enshrined without denouncing the faith which it was designed to celebrate."

In dealing with the function of

reason in social and political life, he reveals how close a realistic political scientist can come to the Christian doctrine of "justification by faith" without ever having heard of it. That is, he is close to it because he understands the problem for which it is the answer. He sees how truth is everywhere corrupted by interest, and yet there is truth; and reason is everywhere the servant of passion, and yet one must not unashamedly make it the servant of passion.

Professor Smith has a remarkable understanding of this same problem in a somewhat different dimension. He is interested to prove that democracy requires general principles such as equality and liberty, but that every principle is relativized in actual history. In a superb chapter upon Abraham Lincoln, he rightly affirms that Lincoln has been elevated to secular sainthood because of his profound understanding of the fact that evil must be tolerated in many an historic situation, but must not, for that reason, be called good. He thinks that Lincoln never joined a church because religion does not understand this paradox. Since New Testament Christianity is rooted in this very paradox, one wishes that Professor Smith, who teaches at Chicago University, had not completely missed contact with those aspects of the Christian truth upon which the soul of Abraham Lincoln was nourished.

R. N.

BEST BOOKS ON SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN 1941

The Impact of War: Or American Democracy Under Arms, by Pendleton Herring. Farrar and Rhinehart, \$2.50.

Business as Usual, The First Year of

Defense, by I. F. Stone. Modern Age, \$2.00.

Freedom of Speech in the United States, by Zechariah Chaffee. Harvard Press, \$4.00.

The Mind of the South, by W. J. Cash. Knopf, \$3.75.

ON THE WAR

Sea Power in a Machine Age, by Bernard Brodie, Princeton, \$3.75.

The Nature of Modern Warfare, by Cyril Falls. Oxford, \$1.25.

Scum of the Earth, by Arthur Koestler. Macmillan, \$2.75. A penetrating account of French decay.

Night Over Europe, by Frederic L. Schuman. Knopf, \$3.50. Useful political analysis. Morally superficial.

Versailles Twenty Years After, by Paul Birdsall. Reynal and Hitchcock, \$3.00.

The Spoil of Europe, by Thomas Reveille. Norton, \$2.75.

Education for Death, by Gregor Ziemer. Oxford, \$2.00. The best book on Nazi educational methods.

The Atlantic System, by Forrest Davis. Reynal and Hitchcock, \$3.00.

France, My Country Through the Disaster, by Jacques Maritain. Longmans Green, \$1.25.

ON RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Christianity and Classical Culture, by Charles Cochrane. Oxford, \$4.00.

Fountainheads of Freedom, by Irvin Edman. An anthology of the religious and philosophic bases of democratic life. Reynal and Hitchcock, \$3.75.

The Passing of the Saint, by John Mecklin. University of Chicago Press, \$2.00.

A Dialectic of Morals, by Mortimer Adler, University of Notre Dame, \$1.75. A neo-Thomist interpretation of political problems.

History as the Story of Liberty, by Benedetto Croce. Norton, \$3.75. A neo-Hegelian interpretation of history.

Reason and Revolution, Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory, by Herbert Marcuse. Oxford, \$3.75. A defense of Hegel against the charges of the relation of his thought to Nazi doctrine.

The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon. Random House, \$4.00.

Darwin, Marx, Wagner, by Jacques Barzun. Little, Brown and Co., \$2.75.

WHOSE WHO

CHARLES STINETTE is curate of Trinity Episcopal Church, Hartford, Connecticut.

DOROTHY FOSDICK is assistant professor of political science at Smith College.

SAM FRANKLIN is the director of the Cooperative Farms in Rochdale and Providence, Mississippi.

ROGER SHINN, who writes of his experiences as a private in the army, won the highest honors of his class in the 1941 graduating class of Union Seminary and waived his theological exemption to join the army.

R. A. LANDOR is a young poet, a member of the Fellowship in Chicago.

The prayers in this issue are arranged by URSULA M. NIEBUHR, instructor in religion at Barnard College.

W. BURNETT EASTON is professor of religion at Massachusetts State College.

A. T. MOLLEGEN is a professor of the Theological Seminary, Alexandria, Virginia.

HERMAN HAUSHEER is a professor of Graceland College, Lamoni, Iowa.

PRAYER OF CONFESSION

O God, our Father, we have sinned against Thee in thought, word and deed: we have not loved Thee with all our heart; we have not loved our neighbors as ourselves. Have mercy upon us, we beseech Thee; cleanse us from our sins; and help us to overcome our faults; through Jesus Christ our Lord. AMEN.

Remember, O Lord, according to the multitude of Thy mercies, Thy whole Church; all who join with us in prayer, all our brethren, on land, on sea, or wherever they may be in Thy vast kingdom, who stand in need of Thy grace and succor. Pour out upon us all the riches of Thy mercy, so that, redeemed in soul and body, and steadfast in faith, we may ever praise Thy wonderful and holy Name; through Jesus Christ our Lord. AMEN.

(Alexandrian Liturgy, Third Century)